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NOTES AND COMMENTS
The Hobbs Act-An Amendment to the Federal
Anti-Racketeering Act
In United States v. Local 8071 the Supreme Court of the United
States held that it was not a violation of the Federal Anti-Racketeering
Act of 19342 for members of a union to stop trucks entering New York
City and by force and violence to compel payment of a day's wages to
a member of the union whether his offer to drive the truck was accepted
or refused.3 Mr. Justice Byrnes in writing the majority opinion said,
"This does not mean that such activities are beyond the reach of federal
legislative control."' 4 As a result, the Hobbs Bill was introduced in the
House of Representatives as an amendment to the Fedeial Anti-Rack-
eteering Act of 1934.8 It was generally recognized in Congress that the
Bill was inspired by the decision in United States v. Local 807.7 Al-
though introduced as an amendment, it was the intent of the author of
the Hobbs Bill to "wipe out" the Act of 1934 and to substitute a new
act in its place.8 In spite of the opposition of labor leaders,9 the Hobbs
Bill became law on July 3, 1946.10
1 United States v. Local 807 of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters,
Chauffeurs, Stablemen & Helpers of America, 315 U. S. 521, 62 Sup. Ct. 642, 86
L. ed.. 1004 (1942). Local 807 and 26 individuals were also indicted for violation
of §1 of the Sherman Act. Conviction was reversed by the Circuit Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit and the government did not seek review of this
part of the judgment. Notes (1942) 11 FORDEAm L. Rxv. 204, 41 Micn. L. REv.
338, 19 N. Y. U. L. Q. REV. 440, 16 TEMPLE L. Q. 329, 90 U. OF PA. L. Rv. 972.
148 STAT. 979 (1934), 18 U. S. C. A. §420a-e (Supp. 1945), "An Act to protect
trade and commerce against interference by violence, threats, coercion, or intim-
idation," approved June 18, 1934; held constitutional, Nick v. United States, 122
F. (2d) 660 (C. C. A. 8th, 1941), 138 A. L. R. 791, 811 (1942), certiorari denied
314 U. S. 687, 62 Sup. Ct. 302, 86 L. ed. 550.
' Evidence indicated that in several cases the defehdants either failed to offer
to work or refused to work for the money when asked to do so. U. S. v. Local
807, 315 U. S. 521, 526, 62 Sup. Ct. 642, 644, 86 L. ed. 1004, 1008 (1942).
'Id. at 536, 62 Sup. Ct. 648, 86 L. ed. 1012.
189 CoNG. REc. 3217 (1943). 688 CONG. REC. 3101-2 (1942).
89 CONG. R.Ec. 3201, 3217 (1943), 79 CONG. Ruc. December 11, 1945, at 12028,
79 CONG. REc. December 12, 1945, at 12085.
689 CoNG. REc. 3217 (1943), 79 CoNG. REC. December 12, 1945, at 12095.
* President William Green of the A. F. of L. urged the veto of the Hobbs Bill
as "dangerous legislation." Anerican Federation of Labor Weekly News Service,
Washington, D. C., June 25, 1946.
" U. S. Code Congressional Service, Advance Sheet No. 6, p. 405, Pub. L. No.
486, Title 1, §2-5 (July 3, 1946).
The legislative history of the Hobbs Act began on March 27, 1942, 88 CoNG.
REc. 3101-2 (1942) ; passed the House of Representatives April 92 1943, 89 CONG.
RE. 3230 (1943) ; bill was not .reported out of the Senate Judiciary Committee;
next passed the House of Representatives on December 12, 1945, 79 CONG. REC.,
December 12, 1945 at 12106; became an amendment to the Case Bill on May 25,
1946, 79 CONG. REC., May 25, 1946 at 5837; vetoed as part of the Case Bill on
June 11, 1946, 79 CONG.'Ruc., June 11, 1946 at 6799; passed Senate as a separate
measure June 21, 1946, 79 CONG. REc., June 21, 1946 at 7384; signed by the Presi-
dent on July 3, 1946, 79 CoNG. REc., July 3, 1946 at 8487.
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The Hobbs Act provides that whoever conspires, attempts, commits
or threatens physical violence to any person or property, or in any way
or degree obstructs, delays, or affects commerce, or the movement of
any article or commodity in commerce, by robbery or extortion, shall be
guilty of a felony.
Robbery is defined in the Hobbs Act in substantially the same words
as those in the New York Penal Code" and extortion is defined in
almost identical words with those used in the Anti-Racketeering Act of
1934.12 Title 1 (b), (c) provides:
The term "robbery" means the unlawful taking or obtaining of
personal property, from the person or in the presence of another,
against his will, by means of actual or threatened force, or violence,
or fear of injury, immediate or future, to his person or property, or
property in his custody or possession, or the person or property of a
relative or member of his family or anyone in his company at the time
of the taking or obtaining.
The term "extortion" means the obtaining of property from an-
other, with his consent, induced by wrongful use of actual or threat-
ened force, violence,' 3 or fear, or under color of official right
Provisions in the Anti-Racketeering Act of 1934 designed to protect
legitimate activities of labor were eliminated by the Hobbs Act and a
safeguard for labor was provided in less extensive language. Instead
of the provisions in the former Act14 which stated that "payment of
wages by a bona-fide employer to a bona-fide employee" were excluded
from the coverage of the Act, and that no court shall construe or apply
the provisions of the Act in such manner as "to impair, diminish, or in
any manner affect the rights of bona-fide labor organizations in lawfully
carrying out the legitimate objects thereof, as such rights are expressed
in existing statutes of the United States," the Hobbs Act provides that
nothing in the Act shall be construed to repeal, modify, or affect either
the Sherman Act, the Norris-LaGuardia Act, the Railway Labor Act
or the National Labor Relations Act.15
" The New York Penal Code defines robbery as "... the unlawful taking of
personal property, from the person or in the presence of another, against his will,
by means of force, or violence, or fear of injury, immediate or future, to his person
or property, or the person or propety of a relative or member of his family, or
of anyone in his company at the time of the robbery." N. Y. PENAL CODE, §2120,
McKixNEY's CONSoL. LAWS OF N. Y., ANN., Book 39, Part 2, p. 533.
Congressman Hobbs gave as his reason for copying the New York definition of
robbery was that most of these "hold-ups" occurred there. 89 CONG. REc. 3226
(1943).
1 §420a(b) of the Anti-Racketeering Act of 1934 is as follows: "Obtains the
property of another, with his consent, induced by wrongful use of force or fear,
or under color of official right!'; 48 STAT. 979 (1934), 18 U. S. C. A. §420a(b)(Supp., 1945).
2" U. S. Code Congressional Service, Advance Sheet No. 6, p. 405, Public Law
486, Title 1, §1(b), (c).
"' 48 STAT. 979 (1934) U. S. C. A. §420a-e (Supp., 1945).
1" Title II of the Hobbs Act is as follows: "Nothing in this Act shall be con-
1946]
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Will members of a labor union be subject to punishment under the
Hobbs Act for engaging in conduct similar to that of members of the
Teamsters' Union in United States v. Local 807 ?16 The decision in that
case relied on the legislative history17 and the specific exemptions 8 of
the Anti-Racketeering Act of 1934. The legislative history of the Hobbs
Act on the other hand clearly indicates an intent on the part of Con-
gress to punish anyone committing the crimes of robbery and extortion
in interstate commerce whether or not in the course of labor activity. 19
The removal of both grounds on which the Supreme Court based its
holding that labor was exempt from prosecution under the Anti-Rack-
eteering Act of 1934 makes it apparent that any attempt on the part of
members of a labor union to exact "wages" through force and violence
or threats thereof as was done in New York by the Teamsters' Union20
will be punishable under the Hobbs Act.
Labor is apprehensive that the Hobbs Act holds the potential danger
of judicial misconstruction and that it is the first "Trojan horse" in a
campaign to weaken labor organizations. 2 ' Is the Hobbs Act anti-labor?
Is labor justified in assuming that the Hobbs Act is a threat to its right
to strike,22 boycott and picket peacefully23 for the obtainment of higher
strued to repeal, modify, or affect either section 6 or section 20 of an Act entitled
'An Act to supplement existing laws against unlawful restraints and monopolies,
and for other purposes,' approved October 15, 1914, or an Act entitled 'An Act to
amend the judicial code and to define and limit the jurisdiction of the courts in
equity, and for other purposes,' approved March 23, 1932, or an Act entitled 'An
Act to provide for the prompt disposition of disputes between carriers and their
employees, and for other purposes,' approved May 20, 1926, as amended, or an
Act entitled 'An Act to diminish the causes of labor disputes burdening or ob-
structing interstate or foreign commerce, to create a National Labor Relations
Board, and for other purposes,' approved July 5, 1935." U. S. Code Congressional
Service, Advance Sheet No. 6, p. 405, Public Law 486 Title II (July 3, 1946).
U. S. v. Local 807, 315 U. S. 521, 62 Supp. Ct. 642, 86 L. ed. 1004 (1942).
1 U. S. v. Local 807, 315 U. S. 521, 528-530, 62 Sup. Ct. 642, 645, 86 L. ed.
1004, 1009 (1942).
" Id. at 535, 62 Sup. Ct. 647-8, 86 L. ed. 1012.
1989 CONG. Rxc. 3217, 3222 (1943), 79 CoNG. RFc., December 12, 1945 at
12085.
" In 1943 the Head of the Office of Defense Transportation reported that over
1,000 trucks a night were being held up and robbed in the various cities of the
United States and over 100 a day at the New York end of the Holland Tunnel.
Congressman Hobbs stated that he had received over 1,000 letters and telegrams
from farmers all over the country stating that the condition was worse in 1945
than it was in 1943. 79 CONG. REc., December 12, 1945, at 12095.
"189 CONG. REc. 3223 (1943), 79 CoNG. REc., December 12, 1945, at 12087.
Statement of Daniel J. Tobin, President of the International Brotherhood of
Teamsters (AFL) in American Federation of Labor Weekly News Service, Wash-
ington, D. C., June 25, 1946. See article by Joseph A. Padway, General Counsel
for the A. F. of L. in AMEIcAN FEDERATIoNIST, September, 1946, at 19-20.
2248 STAT. 449, 29 U. S. C. A. §151 et seq. (July 5, 1935), Section 7 of the
National Labor Relations Act, provides: "Employees shall have the right to self-
organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choos-
ing, and to engage in concerted activities, for the purpose of collective bargaining
or other mutual aid and protection."
Section 13 provides: "Nothing in this Act shall be construed so as to interfere
with or impede or diminish in any way the right to strike."
" Bakery & Pastry Drivers & Helpers Local No. 802, v. Wohl, 315 U. S. 769,
[Vol. 25
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wages, better working conditions and other legal objectives? The
answer appears to be "No." The actual intent of Congress,24 the ex-
press provisions in the Act itself,25 and the unusual precaution on the
part of the President of the United States in placing before Congress
the Attorney General's construction of the Hobbs Act,26 all indicate an
improbability that any of the legitimate activities of labor will be made
criminal by judicial construction of the Act.
The full significance of the Hobbs Act, however, cannot be ascer-
tained until our courts answer the following question: To what extent,
if any, does the Hobbs Act apply in situations in which labor employs its
legal weapons; i.e., a right to strike, boycott, and picket to obtain illegal
objectives? In U. S. v. Compagna2e 7 a threat to strike for an unlawful
purpose was considered coercion within the meaning of the original
Anti-Racketeering Act. It follows that in order to determine whether
a strike is a legal economic weapon of labor or a wrongful use of con-
certed action it is first necessary to reach a conclusion as to the legality
of the objective achieved by the use of a strike.
Is it lawful for a labor union to strike or boycott an employer for
introducing labor saving devices in his business and thereby compel him
to retain or hire unnecessary workers? The authorities are in conflict2 8
on this question. In U. S. v. Carrozo9 a strike in which the employer
was given the choice of not using "truck cement mixers" or paying
unnecessary workers met with the approval of the court. This decision,
affirmed per curiam by the United States Supreme Court, 0 considered
in connection with the right of labor to strike for lawful objectives indi-
cates that the Hobbs Act will not apply in a similar set of circumstances.
However, a different situation is presented in the case in which the
strike was fraught with violence and the union was successful in caus-
62 Sup. Ct. 816, 86 L. ed. 1178 (1942) ; American Federation of Labor v. Swing,
312 U. S. 321, 61 Sup. Ct. 568, 85 L. ed. 855 (1940).
' 89 CONG. REc. 3218 (1943), 79 CONG. RF_., December 11, 1945, at 12024, 79
CONG. REc., December 12, 1945, at 12085, 12089, 12095.
"
5 U. S. Code Congressional Service, Advance Sheet No. 6 at 405, Public Law
486, Title II (July 3, 1946).
"' President Truman approved the Hobbs Bill on the understanding that the
bill according to its language and legislative history "... . is not intended to de-
prive labor of any of its recognized rights, including the right to strike and picket,
and to take other legitimate and peaceful concerted action," 79 CONG. REc., July 3,
1946, at 8417.
'"United States v. Compagna, 146 F. (2d) 524 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1945), certiorari
denied, 324 U. S. 867, 65 Sup. Ct. 912-913, 89 L. ed. 1422 (1945).
' U. S. v. Carrozo, 37 F. Supp. 191 (E. D. Ill. 1941) affrined per curiam in
U. S. v. International Hod Carriers & C. L. Dist. Council, 313 U. S. 539, 61
Sup. Ct. 839, 85 L. ed. 1508 (1941) ; but see Hopkins v. Oxley Stave Co., 83 Fed.
912 (C. C. A. 8th, 1897). Opera on Tour, Inc. v. Weber, 285 N. Y. 348, 34 N. E.(2d) 349 (1941), 136 A. L. R. 267, 282 (1942). Ludwig Teller, LABOR DispUTns
AND CoL"EcTIvE BARGAINING, I, §89.
"U. S. v. Carrozo, 37 F. Supp. 191 (E. D. Ill. 1941).30 Ibid.
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ing the employer to pay unnecessary workers. Should the employer
contend that he acceded to the demands of the union not from economic
coercion but solely because of fear of violence or damage to his prop-
erty, it might be shown that the "stand-by" workers who took money
from the employer in the form of wages were guilty of ". . . obtaining
property from another, with his consent, induced by wrongful use of
actual or threatened force, violence or fear.. ."81 and therefore subject
to be prosecuted for extortion as defined in the Hobbs Act.
A threat to strike or a strike for the purpose of requiring an em-
ployer to pay a fine to the union for violating a union agreement has been
held illegal.32 Peaceful picketing has been enjoined"8 because the ob-
jective, which was to persuade the employer to pay the union initiation
dues for non-union employees, was considered illegal. If unlawful ob-
jectives make a strike or picketing for those objectives a wrongful use
of concerted action, the fact that an employer in these situations was
thus deprived of his property might invoke the provisions of the Hobbs
Act.
Labor leaders who use their position in the union to threaten "labor
trouble" for the purpose of extorting fees 4 from an employer may be
subject to prosecution under the Hobbs Act. Racketeering of this type
was punishable under the Anti-Racketeering Act of 1934.85 Conviction
could be had even though the labor leader had a dual motive of im-
proving the wages of the union members as well as extracting fees to
feather his own nest.80
The sit-down strike presents a different problem. The question of
the illegality of the objective is not material; instead, the illegality of
the strike itself becomes important. The sit-down strike has been de-
dared illegal a7  But would the participants in a sit-down strike be
subject to prosecution under the Hobbs Act? In Apex Hosiery Co. v.
Leader"5 both employees and non-employees of the plant owner forcibly
*' U. S. Code Congressional Service, Advance Sheet No. 6, p. 405, Public Law
486, Title 1, §1(c) (July 3, 1946).
" People v. Seefeldt, 310 Ill. 441, 141 N. E. 829 (1923) ; State v. Dalton, 134
Mo. App. 517, 114 S. W. 1132 (1908); People v. Barondess, 133 N. Y. 649, 31
N. E. 240 (1882).
" Silkworth ef al. v. Local No. 575"of American Federation of Labor, 309
Mich. 746, 16 N. W. (2d) 145 (1944S.'-
1, U. S. v. Lanza, 85 F. (2d) 544. (C.'C. A. 2nd, 1936) certiorari denied, 299
U. S. 609, 57 Sup. Ct. 235, 81 L. ed. 449. See Note (1937) Legislation: Leaal
Implications of Labor Racketeering, 37 COL. L. REv. 993.
"Nick v. United States, 122 F. (2d) 660 (C. C. A. 8th, 1941), U. S. v. Com-
pagna, 146 F. (2d) 524 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1945), certiorari denied, 324 U. S. 867,
65 Sup. Ct. 912-913, 89 L. ed. 1422 (1945).
3' Nick v. United States, cited supra note 35, at 669, 670, 138 A. L. R. at 804.
37 N.L.R.B. v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corporation, 306 U. S. 240, 59 Sup. Ct.
490, 83 L. ed. 627, 123 A. L. R. 599 (1939). Because the strike was "unlawful"
certain of the strikers lost the right to reinstatement with back pay which had
been awarded them by the National Labor Relations Board.
"Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U. S. 469, 60 Sup. Ct. 982, 84 L. ed. 1311,
128 A. L. R. 1044, 1075 (1940).
[Vol. 25
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seized the plant and did considerable damage to the property and
machinery. The effort of the owner to recover his damages by prose-
cution under the Sherman Act -" was unsuccessful. Whether another
wave of sit-down strikes would produce indictments, where interstate
commerce is affected, under the Hobbs Act is a matter of conjecture.
Might not the owner's loss of use of his property or its destruction, by
a sit-down strike, bring the case within the robbery or extortion pro-
visions of the Hobbs Act?
The Antitrust Division, U. S. Department of Justice, for several
years has considered the wrongful use of strikes, boycotts and threats
thereof for the purpose of requiring payment of wages to "stand-by"
workers when labor saving devices are used,40 forcing the hiring of
useless workers,41 preventing the use of cheaper material, or enforcing
illegally fixed prices4" as unlawful and subject to prosecution under the
Sherman Act." A series of recent decisions 45 by the United States
Supreme Court have virtually given labor immunity from prosecution
under the Sherman Act. In Allen Bradley Company v. Local No. 3,
Justice Black said:
"Our holding means that the same labor union activities may or
may not be in violation of the Sherman Act, depending upon whether
the union acts alone or in combinations with business groups. This, it
is argued, brings about a wholly undesirable result-one which leaves
labor unions free to engage in conduct which restricts trade. But
the desirability of such an exemption of labor unions is a question for
the determination of Congress." 40
Now that many activities of labor which the Antitrust Division con-
" Act of July 2, 1890, c. 647, 26 STAT. 209, 15 U. S. C. A. §1 et seq. as
amended.
"Hearings before Subcommittee No. 3 of the Committee on the Judiciary on
H. R. 5218, H. R. 6752, H. R. 6872 and H. R. 7067, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942)
408.
"IId. at 403.
"Miller, Antitrust Labor Problems: Law and Policy (1940) 7 LAw & Cox-
TEmp. PRoB. 82, 89.
']lbid.
"Section 1 of the Sherman Act provides that "Every contract, combination
in the form of trust or otherwise or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce
among the several states or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal." Act of
July 2, 1890, c. 647, 26 STAT. 209, 15 U. S. C. A. §1 et seq., as amended.
"Hunt v. Crumbach, 325 U. S. 821, 65 Sup. Ct. 1545, 89 L. ed. 1954 (1945);
Allen Bradley Company v. Local Union No. 3, 325 U. S. 797, 65 Sup. Ct. 1533,
89-L. ed. 1441 (1945) ; U. S. v. Hutcheson, 312 U. S. 219, 61 Sup. Ct. 463, 85 L.
ed. 788 (1941) ; Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U. S. 469, 60 Sup. Ct.- 982, 84
L. ed. 1311, 128 A. L. R. 1044 (1940). See Notes (1946) 19 Csav. L. Rv. 256
and (1941) 50 YA!,E L. J. 787.
", Allen Bradley Company v. Local Union No. 3, 325 U. S. 797, 809-810, 65
Sup. Ct. 1533, 1540, 89 L. ed. 1939, 1948 (1945). See Philadelphia Record Co. v.
Manufacturing Photo-Engravers Ass'n of Philadelphia et -al., 155 F. (2d) 799
(C. C. A. 3rd, 1946). Labor union was enjoined from combining with a business
association to prevent the plaintiff from producing photo-engraving products at
night. Combination was declared to be in violation of the Sherman Act.
19461
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siders illegal cannot be prosecuted under the Sherman Act, the Hobbs
Act may acquire a greater significance than it would have otherwise.
It may be that henceforth the predominant question to arise in an
analysis of the wrongful activities of labor will no longer be whether
or not there was a restraint of trade under the Sherman Act, but rather
whether or not there was robbery or extortion in interstate commerce
as defined in the Hobbs Act.
WMLIAM B. AYcocK.
Aviation-Liability of Airport for Low Flying-Flights Through
Airspace as Taking of an Easement
With the end of World War II, there has been a great advance in
the field of commercial aviation both on a national and international scale.
This in turn will bring about an increasing amount of litigation over
problems incident to air commerce, and result in further development of
a body of law peculiar to this type of commerce.
A case of interest in this field was recently decided by the United
States Supreme Court,1 and although the case arose out of facts created
by war conditions, the decision is significant as our highest court's first
holding on a problem which will be present as long as we have airports
and aircraft. That problem is the proper adjustment of the conflicting
rights of adjacent landowners and airport operators.
This particular case was an action by one Causby against the United
States for an alleged taking by the defendant of the plaintiff's home
and chicken farm which was adjacent to the Greensboro, North Caro-
lina, municipal airport, leased by the defendant for use as an Army and
Navy air base. The taking complained of was caused by frequent flights
of government aircraft at low altitudes while taking off and landing.
The noise of the planes, and the glare of the landing lights at night
made it impossible to use the land as a chicken farm, and the Court of
Claims found that the plaintiff's property had depreciated in value as a
result of this, and held that the United States had taken an easement
in the airspace from the commencement of the lease, the value of which
was $2,000.00.2 The Supreme Court sustained the Court of Claims as
to the taking of an easement for which plaintiff should be compen-
sated,3 but reversed the case in order that the nature of the easement
I United States v. Causby, 326 U. S. -, 66 Sup. Ct. 1062, 90 L. ed. 971(1946). (Justices Black and Burton dissenting.)
'Causby v. United States, 60 F. Supp. 751 (Ct. Cl. 1945). (Judge Madden
dissenting.)
This was not a taking of an easement by prescription, but an implied taking
giving rise to a suit under the Tucker Act [24 STAT. 505 (1887), 28 U. S. C.
§250(1) (1940)] which gives jurisdiction to the Court of Claims for actions against
the United States ". . . founded upon the Constitution of the United States, .
not sounding in tort. . . ." However, it would seem possible in the light of this
[Vol. 25
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as to permanency could be more clearly determined and it could be de-
cided whether the award made was proper.4
The legal basis for the decision is not new, for as the law of airspace
rights has developed in this c6untry, the general rule seems to be that
the landowner's rights to the surface are subject to the public right of
flight in the airspace above so long as it does not interfere with the
effective use of the surface. 5 Under this theory repeated flights over the
land of another at such low altitudes as to be dangerous to the health
and life of the owner have been held to constitute a nuisance, and this
is true though such low flights are necessary in order to use an adjoin-
ing airport.6 However, unless actual damage to the property is shown
decision that if the low flights continued for the prescriptive period, the landowner
would be without remedy. This is distinguishable from the negative easement of
light and air which has never been recognized in this country. See 4 TANY,
REAL PROPERTY (3rd ed. 1939) §1194 and cases there cited; also Lindly v. Bank,
115 N. C. 553, 20 S. E. 621 (1894). Tiffany recognized that the taking of an ease-
ment by frequent flights over one's land would present difficulties since the flights
of necessity would have to vary as to linear speace and altitude, but goes on to
say: "But whether such reasons are sufficient to preclude in all cases the acquisi-
tion of a prescriptive right of way through the airspace is, it seems, doubtful." Id.
§1203. But see Hinman v. Pacific Air Transport, 84 F. (2d) 755, 759 (C. C. A.
9th, 1936), cert. denied, 300 U. S. 654, 81 L. ed. 864, 57 Sup. Ct. 430 (1937)
(where the court says "... . it is not legally possible for appellees to obtain an
easement by prescription through the airspace above the appellants' land").
'The Court of Claims found that the easement was permanent saying: "... that
upon the expiration of its current lease, defendant no doubt intended to make
some sort of arrangement whereby it could use the airport for its military planes
whenever it had occasion to do so." 60 F. Supp. 751, 758. This language was
looked at as conjecture, and it would seem justly so for the United States would
hardly be expected to pay for an easement over the adjoining land after the lease
of the airport had expired. The present case is not the first claim which has
been made against the government for damages due to low flying army planes.
In Decision of the Comptroller General, 3 Comp. Gen. 234, 1928 U. S. Av. Rep.
46 (Washington, 1923), a claim for damages due to frightening cattle by a low
flying army plane was denied where no negligence was shown. This is in accord
with the general rule that there can be no recovery for fright induced in an animal
which spends itself in the animal as is seen in Nebraska Silver Fox Corp. v.
Boeing, 1932 U. S. Av. Rep. 164 (D. C. D. Neb. 1931) where no recovery was
allowed for fright to plaintiff's silver foxes allegedly caused by defendant's low
flying planes and resulting in their aborting their young. However, when the
negligence of the defendant in flying his dirigible below the statutory minimum
was alleged to have frightened plaintiff's horses resulting in injury to plaintiff it
was held that there was good cause of action. Neiswonger v. Goodyear Tire and
Rubber Co., 35 F. (2d) 761 (D. C. N. D. Ohio, 1929). These cases are some-
what similar to the principal case in that it involved the frightening of the plain-
tiff's chickens; however, the recovery here was not the damage to the business
for the loss of the chickens, but for the special value of the land due to its adapt-
ability for use for this business.
'This is the theory set out by the Uniform Aeronautics Act which has been
adopted in whole or in part by 22 states. See UNFoRm AERONAUncS ACT, §§3,
4, 11 U. L. A. North Carolina adopted both of these sections verbatim; N. C.
GEN. STAT. (1943) §§63-12, 63-13, and the Supreme Court recognizes that the
holding that there is a taking here is in accord with the local law of North Caro-
lina as set out in these statutes.
"Delta Air Corp. v. Kersey, 193 Ga. 862, 20 S. E. (2d) 245, 140 A. L. R.
1352 (1942) (where the facts were very similar to the present case in that the
airport runway was so aligned that planes had to pass at low altitudes over plain-
tiff's house in landing and taking off, and the court reversed a nonsuit for in-
19461
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as a result of the low flights, no relief will be granted,7 except where
continued flights at altitudes less than the statutory minimum altitude
are considered trespasses, and then injunction and nominal damages will
be granted even though no actual damage is present." After low flights
have been going over the property for some time, the landowner will be
enjoined from erecting spite structures which interfere with the flights
and are dangerous to the occupants of the planes,0 but he cannot be
enjoined from using his land in a proper manner, and thus a power com-
pany -could not be prevented from erecting power lines on their land
adjoining an airport. 10 An airport will not be considered a nuisance
per se, and no relief will be granted where the suit is brought in an-
ticipation of a nuisance arising from the construction of an airport near
the property of the plaintiff." It may, however, become a nuisance if
not operated in a proper manner.12 Thus the result of the present case
is in accord with existing principals, for the frequent passage of gov-
ernment planes over the land so interfered with its existing use that it
depreciated in value, and this should entitle the owner to compensation
whether it be on the theory that the flights are a nuisance or that they
constitute a taking of an easement in denial of constitutional rights.13
junction and damages against the city of Atlanta on the theory that such low
flights would constitute a nuisance and thus interfere with the owner's use of Pis
land). Vanderslice v. Shawn, 27 A. (2d) 87 (Del. Ct. Ch. 1942) (where the
low flights over the plaintiff's land were enjoined when they interfered with the
"existing use" of the land).
Thrasher v. City of Atlanta, 178 Ga. 514, 173 S. E. 817 (1934) (where the
court said mere apprehension of injury from the low flights was not enough to
give a right to recover).
S Burnham v. Beverly Airways, 311 Mass. 628, 42 N. E. (2d) 575, 135 A. L. R.
750 (1941); Smith v. New England Aircraft Co., 270 Mass. 511, 170 N. E. 385,
69 A. L. R. 300 (1930). The Burnham case recognizes that it is not in accord
with the nuisance doctrine, where there is a right until it actually interferes with
the existing use of the property. The view of these cases is recognized in the
Restatement of Torts (1938) §159, comment e, and §194. There would seem to
be little reason for calling flights across a person's land at altitudes below stat-
utory minimum in order to take off and land, trespasses and enjoining them
unless there was some injury to the surface, particularly in the light of the public
nature of aviation in these times. Thus the Massachusetts view would seem to
besomewhat out of line with the law of most jurisdictions.
' United Airport Co. v. Hinman, 1940 U. S. Av. Rep. 1 (U. S. D. C. S. D. Cal.
1939); Penn. ex rel. Schnader v. Bestecki, 1937 U. S. Av. Rep. 1 (Ct. Comm.
Pleas, Dauphin County, Pa., 1937); Tucker v. Iowa City, 1936 U. S. Av. Rep.
10 (D. C. Johnson County, Iowa, 1935).
" Guith v. Consumer's Power Co., 36 F. Supp. 21 (E. D. Mich. 1940) ; Capital
Airways v. Indiana Power and Light Co., 215 Ind. 462, 18 N. E. (2d) 776 (1939).
'Warren v. City of Detroit, 308 Mich. 460, 14 N. W. (2d) 134 (1944);
Batchellor v. Commonwealth, 176 Va. 109, 10 S. E. (2d) 529 (1940).2 See note 6 supra; 2 C. J. S. Aerial Navigation, §29.
"'The dissenting opinion of Justice Black (326 U. S. - -, 66 Sup. Ct.
1062, 1069, 90 L. ed. 971, 978) takes the view that this is not the taking of prop-
erty in a constitutional sense, but a suit in tort for damages due to a nuisance and
thus the Court of Claims was without jurisdiction. (See note 3 supra.) This
year Congress passed the Federal Tort Claims Act, part 3 of which gives the
federal district courts jurisdiction, sitting without jury, to hear and adjudge
any claim against the United States for money only, arising ". . . on account of
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Since such an easement of flight has been recognized as a property in-
terest in eminent domain proceedings by the Federal Government,' 4 the
holding that it is also protected by the Fifth Amendment' 5 seems log-
ically to follow.
Since an increasing number of airports are now owned by either
municipal or county governments, 16 the decision in this case creates a
new remedy for the landowner adjoining these airports, for if damages
can be shown to his property by low flying planes he may be able to
prove a taking entitling him to compensation under the Fourteenth
Amendment,' 7 whereas in the past he has been limited to suit on either
the nuisance18 or trespass 0 theories. The fact that the airports are
owned by the city or county, however, gives them certain remedies for
protecting the airport approaches which can prevent a suit of this nature
ever arising; for since it is generally held that the operation of an air-
port by a city or county is for a public purpose,20 or even in the nature
of a public utility,2 ' certain rights accrue to them which would not
ordinarily be given to a privately owned airport.
The first and obvious remedy to prevent suits of this nature would
be to acquire enough land by purchase or eminent domain proceedings
damage to or loss of property or on account of personal injury or death caused
by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the government
while acting within the scope of his office or employment.. . " The act also
provides for appeal either to the circuit court of appeals or the Court of Claims
by the losing party. Chap. 753, Public Law 601, Title IV, United States Code
Congressional Service, Advance Sheet No. 6 (1946). Under this law it would
seem that should a person wish to bring a suit of this nature against the Fedeial
Government he could bring it either under the theory of the principal case or
merely as a suit in tort for damages under the nuisance theory. If it were brought
under the latter theory, however, he would be- limited to damages, for the consent
to be sued is for money only, and this would not include injunctive relief.
"United States v. 357.25 Acres of Land, 55 F. Supp. 461 (W. D. La. 1944)
(where the government recognized that such an easement existed as a property
right by bringing condemnation proceedings to procure an easement of navigation
above 25 feet over property adjoining an airport). In this case all compensation
was denied the landowner, since there was already a zoning ordinance which
restricted the use of the land above 25 feet and thus the property owner suffered
no further damage from the condemnation of the easement.
" UN TED STATES COST. AMEND. V.1 8Rhyne, ARPORTS AND THE CouRTs, National Institute of Municipal Law
Officers, (1944) Chap. I-III.17 U. S. CosT. AMEND. XIV, §1.
19 See note 6 supra.
19 See note 8 supra.
SKrenwinkle v. City of Los Angeles, 4 Cal. (2d) 611, 51 Pac. (2d) 1098 (1935);
People ex rel. Curren v. Wood, 391 IIl. 237, 62 N. E. (2d) 809 (1945) ; Wichita
v. Clapp, 125 Kan. 100, 263 Pac. 12 (1928); Dysart v. City of St. Louis, 321 Mo.
514, 11 S. W. (2d) 1045 (1928); Heese v. Rath, 249 N. Y. 436, 164 N. E. 342
(1928) ; Turner v. Reidsville, 224 N. C. 42, 29 S. E. (2d) 211 (1944) ; Airport
Authority v. Johnson, 226 N. C. 1, 36 S. E. (2d) 803 (1946); Clintock v. City of
Roseburg, 127 Oregon 698, 273 Pac. 331 (1929).
" State v. Johnson, 117 Neb. 301, 220 N. W. 273 -(1928); State v. City of
Cleveland, 26 Ohio App. 265, 160 N. E. 241 (1927) ; Pierce v. Storms, 191 Okla.
410, 130 P. (2d) 523 (1942); and in Thrasher v. City of Atlanta, cited supra note
7, the court speaks of airports as "indispensable public utilities."
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at the initial planning stage so that the airport approaches would be pro-
tected and there would never be any question of interference with the
adjoining landowners. There are a great number of cases upholding
municipalities' right to condemn land under eminent domain proceedings
for the purpose of building airports on the theory that it is for a public
use,22 and this is expressly authorized by statute in some jurisdictions. 2
As a practical matter this may not work out, though, for acquisition of
complete title to land adjoining the airport would result in a great deal
of unnecessary expense.
A second, less expensive, and increasingly popular method is merely
to procure the airspace rights above a certain altitude over the adjacent
land by purchase or eminent domain. The latter of these two methods
is exemplified in a proceeding brought by the Federal Government in
Louisiana to acquire such rights over land adjoining an airport which
was being built.2 4 A substantial number of states now provide for this
by statute, either as a general power given to municipalities in addition
to their power to condemn the land for the airport itself,25 or as a part
of a law for zoning the approaches to airports.26  The only difficulty
with this type of remedy is in determining the value of the rights ac-
quired in order to compensate the owner of the land over which the
easement is taken. The result of this type of remedy is similar to the
'2 Burnham v. Mayor and Aldermen of Beverly, 309 Mass. 388, 35 N. E. (2d)
242, 135 A. L. R. 750 (1941) (where a statute gave city the right to establish
municipal airport, but did not expressly give power of eminent domain for this
purpose; the court implied the power to condemn property under general powers
given city to condemn property for any public purpose). See also Howard v.
City of Atlanta, 190 Ga. 730, 10 S. E. (2d) 190 (1940) ; In re Airport of City of
Utica, 134 Misc. 60, 234 N. Y. S. 668 (1929); Spokane v. Williams, 157 Wash.
120, 288 Pac. 258 (1930) ; and Central Hanover Bank and T. Co. v. Pan American
Airways, 137 Fla. 808, 188 So. 820 (1939) (where the court allowed a private
corporation to condemn land for use as an air terminal).
2 This is provided for in the Uniform Airports Act, Section 3 of which has
been adopted by Florida, Georgia, Minnesota, South Carolina, and Utah. UNI-
FORm AmoaTs AcT §3, 11 U. L. A. North Carolina expressly provides that an
airport is for a public purpose and that cities have the right to acquire lands for
them by eminent domain. N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §65-5. For a general dis-
cussion of this problem and the laws applicable to different states see Rhyne, op.
cit. supra, note 16, Chap. II; and Hunter and Ulman, Airport Legal Developments
(1942) 13 JOURNAL AIR LAW 116.2 United States v. 35725 Acres of Land, cited supra note 14.
" Laws Del. 1945, c. 300, §2; CODE OF IOWA (1946) §330.5; GEN. STAT. KAN.
(Corrick, 1945 Supp.) §3-113; MINN. STAT. (1941) §360.28; NEB. R vxsEn Am-
PoRTs Acr (1945) §11(2) ; OHIO GEN. CODE (Page, 1938) §3939; CODE OF S. C.
(Michie, 1942) §7112-37.
"'CODE OF ALA. (1940) tit. 4, §30; Colo. Laws (1945) c. 4, §8(a) ; ILL. STAT.
ANN. (Smith-Hurd, 1942 Supp.) c. 15Y2, §46; LA. GEN. STAT. (Dart, 1946 Supp.)
§27.49; REVISED STAT. ME. (1944) c. 21, §15; Laws of Mont. 1945, c. 152,
§19; REVISED LAWS OF N. H. (Rumford, 1942) c. 51, §86; N. M. STAT. ANN.
(1941) §47.210; 23 CoxsoL LAWS OF N. Y. (McKinney, 1946 Supp.) §§355, 356;
N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §63-36; OKLA. STAT. ANN. (1946 Supp.) §3-113; PA.
STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1945 Supp.) §1563; Laws of S. D. 1943, c. 2, §9; TENN.
CODE ANN. (Williams, 1945 Supp.) §2726.38; UTAH CODE ANN. (Moore, 1943)
§4-0-59; VA. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1946 Supp.) §3775; Laws of Wash. 1945, c.
174, §13.
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result reached in the principal case, in that after the condemnation pro-
ceedings are complete the landowner is compensated for the right of
flight over his land, and the political subdivision which is operating the
airport acquires an easement for the benefit of the general public.
A third way to protect the approaches to airports and thus in effect
acquire easements over adjoining land is the passage of zoning legisla-
tion restricting the height of structures within certain distances from
the airport. A number of states have passed this type of statute now
as a practical and inexpensive solution to the airport approach problem.27
Statutes of this type do not completely prevent the result reached in the
principal case, however, for it is conceivable that even though the land-
owner complied with the zoning ordinances and did not build a structure
above the maximum height, if the low flights over the land constituted
a nuisance and caused his land to materially depreciate as a result, it
would still seem to constitute a taking under the theory of the principal
case. This would not be so in the second remedy mentioned, for where
there is an outright condemnation of the easement, the owner is com-
pensated for the right of flight over the land, and its interference with
his use of the land and possible nuisance effect would be considered in
determining the amount of compensation he should get for easement.
The fact that these zoning ordinances limit the activity of the landowner
on the surface by limiting the height to which he can build within a
certain distance from the airport in effect places a servitude on the land
which might well be called an easement for the benefit of the general
public. There seem to be no appellate decisions questioning the con-
stitutionality of these statutes, 28 but they would seem to fall within the
" Twenty-six states have passed these statutes. See: CODE OF ALA. (1943
Supp.) tit. 4, §20(14); ARYA.NSAS STAT. (Pope, 1941 Supp.) p. 979; FLA. STAT.
ANN. (1943) §149.10; ILL. STAT. ANN. (Smith-Hurd, 1942 Supp.) c. 153 2, §38
et seq.; IND. STAT. ANN. (Bums, 1943 Supp.) §14-606; LA. GEN. STAT. (Dart,
1946 Supp.) §27.40 et seq.; REvisED STAT. ME. (1944) c. 21, §8 et seq.; ANN.
CODE MD. (1939) Art. 1-A, §58; ANN. LAws MAss. (1945 Supp.) c. 90, §40;
MicH. CODE ANN. (Henderson, 1945 Supp.) §10.251; Miss. CODE ANN. (1942)
§7540; Laws Mont. 1945, c. 152, §19; REVisED LAWS OF N. H. (Rumford, 1942)
c. 51, §78 et seq.; N. M. STAT. ANN. (1941) §47.201 et seq.; 23 CoNsoL. LAWS OF
N. Y. (McKinney, 1946 Supp.) §§355, 356; N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §63-29 et
seq.; OxLA. STAT. ANN. (1946 Supp.), §3-101 et seq.; OaGON CoMpILED LAWS
ANN . (1943 Supp.) §45-505; PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1945 Supp.) §1550 et seq.;
Laws of S. D. 1943, c. 2, §1 et seq.; TENN. CODE ANN. (Williams, 1945 Supp.)
§2726.47 et seq.; Laws of Vt. 1945, No. 50; UTAH CODE ANN. (Moore, 1945
Supp.) §4-0-68 et seq.; Laws of Wash. 1945, c. 174, §1 et seq.; Laws of Wis.
1945, c. 235, §59-97; Laws of Wyo. 1941, c. 110. For a discussion of the Model
Airports Zoning Act as adopted in North Carolina, see (1941) 19 N. C. L. Ray.
548.281 In Mutual Chemdcal Co. v. City of Baltinwre, 1939 U. S. Av. Rep. 11 (Cir.
Ct. Baltimore, 1939) the court held unconstitutional the Maryland zoning act as a
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution in that
it restricted the use of private property without compensation and was thus a taking
of the property. This case would seem to overlook the fact that airports are
considered to be for a public purpose when operated by a municipality for the
use of the general public (see note 20 supra), and thus the adjoining landowners
would have to yield some rights for public safety and public transportation.
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same classification as other zoning ordinances which have been upheld
on the basis that they are authorized restrictions on the individual's land
for the benefit of the general public under the police power of the
state. 9 These ordinances do not affect existing structures above the
limited height, since such would be a taking of property without due
process of law, but they generally have a provision that any structure in
the zoned area above the limited height may be condemned and the
owner compensated therefor 30
It is seen then, that the result of the principal case is not one which
is new in our law, for it has been recognized by statute in a majority of
our states that an easement of avigation is a necessity, both to protect
the general public from hazards surrounding airports and to protect
the adjacent landowners from invasions due to low flights over their
land in taking off and landing. It is submitted, however, that litigation
of this type may be avoided in the future by the use of remedies avail-
able to municipalities as agents of the states operating the airports for
a public purpose. Should a similar case arise against the Federal Gov-
ernment, it would now be unnecessary to bring it on the implied taking
theory, for the Federal Tort Claims Act a1 gives the consent of the
Government to be sued in tort, and the litigant could bring his suit on
the theory that the low flights damaged his property as a nuisance.
C. D. HOGUE, JR.
Federal Declaratory Judgments in Disability Insurance Cases-
Determination of Jurisdictional Amount
The federal district courts have jurisdiction of cases involving a
federal question and of diverse citizenship cases only where the "mat-
ter in controversy" exceeds, exclusive of interest and costs, the sum or
value of $3,000.1
In suits by and against insurance companies under the Federal
Declaratory Judgment Act the federal courts are not in accord on the
question of what constitutes the "matter in controversy." The problem
centers around the inclusion or exclusion of future benefits in determin-
ing whether the matter in controversy exceeds $3,000; i.e., shall benefits
due to date of suit only be considered, or shall the value of the matter
in controversy *be determined by benefits accrued plus future benefits,
based on the life expectancy of the insured? Two recent decisions in
the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth and Ninth Circuits serve to
illustrate this problem.
" Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U. S. 365, 47 Sup. Ct. 114, 71
L. ed. 303 (1926).
a' See note 26 supra.
Si See note 13 supra.
136 STAT. c. 91 (1911), 28 U. S. C. A. §41(1).
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In Fowles v. Commercial Casualty Insurance Co.2 suit was brought
under the Federal Declaratory judgment Act for the purpose of obtain-
ing a declaration of the defendant's liability to pay weekly disability
benefits and hospital expenses under the provisions of its insurance
policy. The plaintiff alleged that benefits were due which amounted to
less than $3,000; his life expectancy of twenty-nine years, and that he
would be entitled to receive, under the terms of the policy, benefits
amounting to $38,000 if he lived the expectancy period. The plaintiff
further alleged that the defendant refused to pay, claiming that the
plaintiff had lost his right to disability benefits by reason of changing
his occupation. The district court held that plaintiff's claimed right
under the policy to disability benefits during his life if permanently and
totally disabled was placed in doubt by the company's claim that it had
been lost because the insured had changed his occupation. The district
court concluded that this right was the matter in controversy and the
value of this right exceeded the $3,000 jurisdictional requirement. The
Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed this decision,
holding that "no right to such future benefits existed at the time the
action was commenced. No one at that time knew or could have known
whether such a right would ever exist. Therefore, as to such future
benefits, there was, and could have been at that time, no controversy." 3
The court did not mention the plaintiff's allegation that the defendant
refused to pay because it claimed the plaintiff lost his right as a result
of a change of occupation.
Travelers Insurance Co. v. Greenfield was another action under the
Federal Declaratory Judgment Act to determine the insurer's liability
for disability benefits. Only $515 in accrued benefits plus a reasonable
attorney's fee was alleged to be due at the time the suit was filed. The
plaintiff proved his life expectancy of six years, and showed that assum-
ing he would fulfill his life expectancy, he would be entitled to benefits
of not less than $3,100. Plaintiff also alleged that payment of premiums
was waived under the terms of the policy if disability existed, but that
defendant denied plaintiff's total disability, and threatened to consider
the policies lapsed if plaintiff failed to pay. Plaintiff alleged that such
59 F. Supp. 693 (E. D. Wash. 1945).
' Commercial Casualty Ins. Co. v. Fowles, 154 F. (2d) 884 (C. C. A. 9th,
1946).
154 F. (2d) 950 (C. C. A. 5th, 1946). In New York Life Ins. Co. v. Green-field, 154 F. (2d) 953 (C. C. A. 5th, 1946), suit was brought to recover $1,250
accrued benefits plus a reasonable attorney's fee. The district court took jurisdic-
tion but the circuit court of appeals reversed the decision with instructions to the
lower court to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. It does not appear
that any evidence was offered as to the actuarial value of future benefits if any
should become payable and the circuit court of appeals held no reasonable at-
torney's fee could bring the amount claimed over $3,000. The Federal Declaratory
Judgment Act was not involved.
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a threat is equivalent to a threat of cancellation of the policy and thereby
brings into controversy the entire face value of the policy which ex-
ceeded $3,000. The court held that the allegation attempting to meas-
ure the amount in controversy by disability payments during the life
expectancy of the insured, plus the reserve it is alleged the company
must set aside, plus the amount of premiums to be waived in the future,
in the absence of an attempt by the insurer to cancel the policy, are
insufficient to show a present, or actual controversy involving an amount
in excess of $3,000.
These two cases illustrate the need for a clear definition of the
"matter in controversy" to avoid the loss of time and expense involved
in prosecuting such suits through the district and circuit courts, and the
delay in deciding petitions for removal to the federal courts. In each
case the district court had determined that the "matter in controversy"
exceeded $3,000, and in each case the circuit court of appeals held other-
wise. The plaintiffs must now commence their actions anew in the
state courts if they wish a final determination of their claims.
The federal courts have variously interpreted the phrase "matter in
controversy" when applying this language to suits involving disability
benefits under insurance policies. There is a conflict as to whether the
legal necessity of maintaining a reserve in excess of $3,000 to meet dis-
ability claims satisfies the jurisdictional requirement. 5 There is also a
conflict as to whether future payments should be considered in deter-
mining the jurisdictional amount.6
" The following cases held legal reserve incidental and collateral to suit and not
the matter in controversy: Berlin v. Travelers Ins. Co. of Hartford, Conn., 18 F.
Supp. 126 (Md. 1937); Eddleman v. Travelers Ins. Co. of Hartford, Conn., 21
F. Supp. 209 (Md. 1937); Small v. New York Life Ins. Co., 18 F. Supp. 820 (N.
D. Ala. 1937); Shabotsky v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 21 F. Supp. 166 (S. D.
N. Y. 1937); Huey v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 23 F. Supp. 708 (N. D.
Ala. 1938); Stockman v. Reliance Life Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa., 28 F. Supp.
446 (W. D. S. C. 1939) ; Travelers Ins. Co. v. Wechsler, 34 F. Supp. 721 (S. D.
Fla. 1940); Asbury v. New York Life Ins. Co., 45 F. Supp. 513 (E. D. Ky.
1942); Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N. Y. v. Moyle, 116 F. (2d) 434 (C. C. A. 4th,
1940).
Contra: Jensen v. New York Life Ins. Co., 50 F. (2d) 512 (C. C. A. 8th,
1931); Ross v. Travelers Ins. Co., 18 F. Supp. 819 (E. D. S. C. 1936) ; Struble
v. Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co. of Hartford, 20 F. Supp. 779 (S. D. Fla. 1937) ; Penn.
Mut. Life Ins. Co. of Philadelphia v. Joseph, 5 F. Supp. 1003 (Minn. 1934);
Thackelson v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 9 F. Supp. 570 (Minn. 1934).
'The following cases support view that future payments are included: Thomp-
son v. Thompson, 226 U. S. 551, 57 L. ed. 347, 33 S. Ct. 129 (1913) (suit by wife
for alimony payments). The court held the jurisdictional requirement met by
regarding the actuarial value of possible future payments as the matter in con-
troversy. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen v. Pinkston, 293
U. S. 96, 79 L. ed. 219, 55 S. Ct. 1 (1934); Ballard v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of
N. Y., 109 F. (2d) 388 (C. C. A. 5th, 1940); Penn. Mut. Life Ins. Co. of Phila.
v. Joseph, 5 F. Supp. 1003 (Minn. 1934) ; Franzen v. E. I. Du Pont de Nemours
& Co., Inc., 36 F. Supp. 375 (N. J. 1941), aff'd, 146 F. (2d) 837 (C. C. A. 3d,
1944).
Contra: Wright v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York, 19 F. (2d) 117 (C. C.
A. 5th, 1926), aff'd, 226 U. S. 602; Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of U. S. v. Wilson,
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The starting premise in these cases is that the collateral or probative
effect of the judgment is not to be considered in determining the value
of the matter in controversy. This rule was laid down by the Supreme
Court in an analogous situation in Town- of Elgin v. Marshalt' and
seems to influence those courts which limit the matter in controversy to
accrued benefits. However, the Supreme Court has in Thompson v.
Thompsons and Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen v. Pinkstoni ap-
proved an actuarial valuation of a claim as the test. These decisions
guide the courts broadly construing "matter in controversy" to include
future payments.
In the Pinkston case the Supreme Court made a distinction between
actions at law to recover overdue installments and a suit in equity to
81 F. (2d) 657 (C. C. A. 9th, 1936) (complaint seeking $750 benefit due under
$2,500 policy; held: jurisdictional amount could not be attained by adding face of
policy to such payments "even though answer alleged lapse of policy for nonpay-
ment of premiums) ; Colorado Life Co. v. Steele, 95 F. (2d) 535 (C. C. A. 8th,
1938); Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N. Y. v. Moyle, 116 F. (2d) 434 (C. C. A. 4th,
1940); La Vecchia v. Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co. of Hartford, Conn., 1 F. Supp.
588 (S. D. N. Y. 1932); Hines v. Fidelity Mut. Life Ins. Co., 6 F. Supp., 692
(E. D. N. Y. 1934); Moon v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co., 28 F. Supp. 199 (S. D.
W. Va. 1939); Asbury v. New York Life Ins. Co., 45 F. Supp. 513 (E. D. Ky.
1943); Mitchell v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N. Y., 31 F. Supp. 441 (W. D. La.
1940); Burton v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N. Y., 48 F. Supp. 168 (W. D. Ky.
1943) (where the court recognized that it was departing from its own ruling in
two previous cases neither of which had been reported).
Sometimes the form of the state judgment given in like cases may determine
whether the "matter in controversy" includes future payments. Thus in Franzen
v. E. I. Du Pont de Vemours & Co., Inc., 36 F. Supp. 375 (N. J. 1941), aff'd, 146
F. (2d) 836 (C. C. A. 3d, 1944) the court held, where plaintiff was suing under
the Louisiana Workmen's Compensation Act, that in that state a judgment under
the Act for weekly benefits until death or remarriage is erroneous; proper judg-
ment being for death benefits for the full period of 300 weeks, and the fact that
death or remarriage would cut off future benefits is immaterial. Hence judgment
for 300 weeks at $14.30 per week, or $4,270, met federal jurisdictional require-
ment. Only $729.30 was due at the time suit was brought.
However, in Asbury v. New York Life Ins. Co., 45 F. Supp. 513 (E. D. Ky.
1942), the federal court held that the unique Kentucky rule whereby if plaintiff
succeeded in establishing his claim of permanent disability, he gets a declaratoryjudgment in respect to his right to waiver of future premiums did not apply in
determining the "matter in controversy" in a federal jurisdictional controversy.
7 106 U. S. 578, 27 L. ed. 304, 2 Sup. Ct. 1 (1882) (suit to recover $1,660.75
allegedly due on coupons detached from municipal bonds issued by defendant).
Although -judgment would include the disputed liability on principal sum, not yet
due, the court declined to take jurisdiction, holding that statute limiting federaljurisdiction had reference to the matter directly in dispute, and not the collateral
or probative effect of the judgment.
* 226 U. S. 551, 57 L. ed. 347, 33 Sup. Ct. 129 (1913) (suit by wife for alimony
payments). The court held the jurisdictional requirement met by regarding the
actuarial value of possible future payments as the matter in controversy.
0 293 U. S. 96, 79 L. ed. 219, 55 Sup. Ct. 129 (1934) (suit brought by a widow
to preserve her right to participate in a fund from which she was entitled to
pension so long as she did not remarry). The court held that the amount in con-
troversy was the present value of her interest calculable from the amount of her
monthly payment and her life expectancy. The court said that this was not an
action at law to recover overdue installments, but a suit in equity to preserve and
protect a right to future participation in the fund, and if the value of that right
exceeds $3,000, the district court has jurisdiction.
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preserve and protect a right to future participation in a fund. This
distinction has generally been accepted in the insurance cases. Thus in
ordinary suits at law for accrued benefits, the generally accepted rule is
that only the amount due is considered in determining the jurisdictional
amount.' 0 This result is reached by applying the rule that the collateral
or probative effect of the judgment is not the test. However, when the
validity of the policy is in issue, as in suits to cancel the policy for fraud,
the face amount of the policy, or the maximum liability is the test."'
When this distinction is made, the apparent conflict between many of
the decisions is reconciled. However, the failure of some of the federal
courts to make this distinction accounts to some extent for the conflict.
Hence in suits under disability policies, where the only issue is the
fact of disability, the only "matter in controversy" is the amount of
accrued benefits. In this type of case, the insurer merely denies that
the insured has met the conditions prescribed in the policy. Future
benefits are not in issue. However, if th6 insurer relies on any other
defense, such as fraud or non-coverage, the matter in controversy would
be the maximum possible liability if the insurer's position is not upheld.
Here the insurer is not merely denying that the insured has met the
conditions of the policy, but that, assuming he has, he is still not entitled
to benefits, past or future. The insurer, by this defense, puts the in-
sured's right to future benefits in issue. However, in cases of this
latter type, the criterion is not the face amount of the policy, but the
amount of benefits both past and future to which the insured would be
entitled so long as he is disabled. The use of the insured's life ex-
pectancy in evaluating the matter in controversy is no more speculative
than considering the face amount of the policy 12 which is the generally
accepted test in suits to cancel ordinary life insurance policies.
In Fowles v. Commercial Casualty Insurance Co.,'3 since the insurer
did not merely put in issue the fact of disability, which would be a
proper case for limiting the amount in controversy to accrued benefits,
but went further and maintained that the insured had lost his right to
all benefits, it seems that the case is a proper one for measuring the
"matter in controversy" by both past and future benefits. The insurer
was not merely denying the insured's right to past benefits, but also
denying that insured would ever have any right to disability benefits.
Thus it is clear that the accrued disability benefits were not the sole
10 Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N. Y. v. Moyle, 116 F. (2d) 434 (C. C. A. 4th,
1940); Stevenson v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 92 F. (2d) 406 (C. C. A. 4th,
1937); Shabotsky v. Mass. Mut. Life.Ins. Co., 21 F. Supp. 166 (S. D. N. Y.
1937).13Anno: 81 L. ed. 214-216.
"See note (1943) 8 MISSOURi L. REv. 131, criticizing use of face value of
policy as test.1
=See note 2 supra.
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"matter in controversy," but- in fact the maximum liability of the in-
surer for past and future disability payments was at stake.
Travelers Ins. Co. v. Greenfield14 seems to be a proper case for lim-
iting the "matter in controversy" to accrued benefits. Here the only
controversy was over the question of disability; the insured claiming
that he was totally disabled, and the insurer denying this claim. By a
mere denial of disability the insurer did not put future benefits in issue,
but merely denied insured's right to accrued benefits. There was no-
controversy as. to future benefits, hence the court properly excluded
them in determining the value of the "matter in controversy." The
court, although not specifically mentioning the alleged threat of the in-
surer to cancel the policy, did not consider the face value of the policy
as the matter in controversy. This result is in accord with the Supreme
Court's ruling in N. Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Viglac.t 5 There the insurer
denied the insured's claimed disability and consequently refused to waive
the payment of premiums. When the insured failed to pay a premium,
the insurer noted on its records that the policy had lapsed. The insured
treated this as a repudiation of the entire contract and brought suit for
damages. The insured attempted to measure the damages by the sur-
render value of the policy plus the future benefits to become due under
the terms of the policy if the insured remained totally disabled. The
Supreme Court held that the action of the insurer, even though mis-
taken, did not amount to a repudiation of its entire contract but only to
a breach of the obligation to pay benefits. Hence the damages recover-
able by the insured did not exceed the benefits due at the commencement
of the suit.
In the Greenfield case, the alleged threat of the insurer to cancel the
policy, even if disability were established by the insured, would amount
to no more than a breach of the obligation under the disability pro-
visions of the policy. This breach of the contract would be only as to
accrued benefits, since the insurer based his action solely on the belief
that the insured was not totally disabled. The insurer had not repudi-
ated its obligation to pay benefits in the future if the insured became
totally disabled.
It is suggested that the "matter in controversy" in suits brought
under the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act should depend on the
nature of the defense of the insurer just as it depends on the nature of
its claim if it initiates the action. If the defense is a mere denial of
disability, then accrued benefits are only to be considered. However, if
the insurer denies liability on any other ground, then the actuarial value
of the disability provisions in the policy should govern.
J. T. RNDL-EmAw.
14 See note 4 supra.
a'297 U. S. 672, 80 L. ed. 971, 56 Sup. Ct. 615 (1936).
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Pleading-Amendments Changing the Cause of Action-
Limitations of Action-New Statute Proposed
In a recent West Virginia case the plaintiff, a town employee, sued
to recover for personal injuries sustained when he fell from the back
of the town garbage truck, alleging the negligence of the town in fur-
nishing defective equipment and the negligence of the driver, also a
town employee. A demurrer to the complaint was sustained on the
grounds of immunity in the performance of governmental function.
The West Virginia Supreme Court affirmed.2 Plaintiff amended his
complaint to state a cause of action for failure to maintain the streets.3
The defendant moved to strike that portion of the amendment which
alleged failure to maintain the streets as it stated a new.cause of action,
and demurred to the remainder. The motion was granted and the de-
murrer sustained. On appeal the court followed the West Virginia
rule that an amendment stating a new cause of action cannot be allowed.
The original complaint stated a cause of action at common law and the
amendment stated a cause of action under the statute.
This case raises the questions: (1) What is an admendment that
changes the cause of action? and (2) When will an amendment that
changes the cause of action be allowed?
A prerequisite to answering the first question is a discussion of the
much debated and variously defined term "cause of action." The au-
thorities can be divided into two general categories:
(1) The liberal view-Judge Charles E. Clark says: "The cause of
action under the code should be viewed as an aggregate of operative
facts which give rise to one or more relations of right-duty between two
or more persons."4  The essence of this view is that the facts of a
transaction or occurrence, instead of the right or rights violated, con-
stitute the cause of action and that each cause is limited only by trial
convenience, not by the rights involved.
(2) The strict view-Professor John N. Pomeroy says: "The cause
of action . . . will . . . always be the facts from which the plaintiff's
primary right and the defendant's corresponding primary duty have
arisen, together with the facts which constitute the defendant's delict or
act of wrong." 5  The essence of this view is that the right violated
1 Hayes v. Town of Cedar Grove, - , W. Va. - , 37 S. E. (2d) 450(1946).
126 W. Va. 828, 30 S. E. (2d) 726, 156 A. L. R. 702 (1944).
1 W. VA. CoDE ANN. (1943) §1597 (9). (Makes the town liable for failure
to properly maintain the streets.)
' Clark, The Code Cause of Action (1924) 33 YALE L. J. 817, 837. Various defi-
nitions of the code cause of action are also discussed in CLARic, CODE PLEWING
,a1928) §19. For a critical analysis of Clark's view see Wheaton, The Code
'Cause of Action": Its Definition (1936) 22 ComR. L. Q. 1.
'PoMERoY, CODE REMEDIES (5th ed. 1929) §347. In the same section it is said,
... the primary right and duty and delict or wrong combined constitute the
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constitutes the cause of action and that each cause is limited to one
primary right and the violation thereof.
In determining whether or not an amendment states a new cause of
action, over the years the North Carolina Supreme Court has repeat-
edly adopted the liberal view. Dissenting in Jones v. MiolO (1878)
Chief Justice Smith pointed out, "The complaint which supersedes the
declaration is required to contain only a plain and concise statement of
the facts constituting a cause of action. . . ." This dissent led to a
reversal on rehearing.7  In Lassiter v. Norfolk & C. R. R.8 (1904)
Chief Justice Clark said, "The 'cause of action' is the 'statement of
facts,' upon the happening or non-happening of which the plaintiff bases
his action." In McLaughlin v. Raleigh, C. & S. Ry.0 (1917) after
citing five North Carolina cases Justice Allen said, "These authorities
and others also hold that the cause of action is the wrong done-here,
the burning of the lumber. . . ." As recently as 1944, in Nassaney v.
Cudler,10 justice Seawell said, "But in applying the test [whether an
amendment states a new cause of action] we must regard the factual
situation and the manner in which it develops rather than technical
labels."
The rule that a defective statement of a good cause of action may
be cured by amendment,'1 and the rule that the original complaint may
cause of action in the legal sense of the term, and as it is used in the codes of the
several states."
Judge Phillips appears to place the same emphasis on the right-duty relation-
ship. "The formal statement of operative facts showing [plaintiff's] right' and
[defendant's] delict shows a cause for action on the part of the state and in behalf
of the complainant, and is called, in legal phraseology, a cause of action." PHMLUls,
CODE PLEADING (2d ed. 1932) §187.
Prof. McCaskill: "It is that group of operative facts which, standing alone,
would show a single right in the -plaintiff and a single delict to that right giving
cause for the state, through its courts, to afford relief to the party or parties
whose right was invaded." McCaskill, Actions and Causes of Actions (1925) 34
YALE L. J. 614, 638.
679 N. C. 164, 168 (1878).
82 N. C. 252 (1880). Plaintiff was allowed to plead a special contract and
recover on quantum meruit without amendment.
8 136 N. C. 89, 90, 48 S. E. 642, 643 (1904). Plaintiff's intestate was killed
in Virginia. In this action for wrongful death, plaintiff failed to allege the Vir-
ginia statute. Trial court denied plaintiff's motion to amend and set forth Virginia
statute as such an amendment was a new cause of action. Held: Amendment
should be allowed to perfect the statement of a good cause of action. Note: Since
passage of N. C. GEN. STAT. §8-4 in 1931, this problem would not arise. This
statute requires the courts to take judicial notice of the laws of other states. 223
N. C. 360, 26 S. E. (2d) 911 (1943).
174 N. C. 182, 185, 93 S. E. 748, 749 (1917). The trial court allowed one
plaintiff to withdraw and permitted an amendment alleging sole ownership in the
remaining plaintiff. Affirmed. "The cause of action is the negligence." Headnote,
id. at 183.
10 224 N. C 323, 327, 30 S. E. (2d) 226, 229 (1944). The trial court allowed
amendment setting forth conduct of the defendant subsequent to filing the original
complaint. Affirmed. "The fact that, if standing alone, it might form the basis of
a separate suit, if indeed it had that completeness, is not determinative."
2' 37 C. J., Limitation of Actions §509.
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be enlarged, narrowed, amplified, or fortified by amendment without
changing the cause of action'2 have been frequently applied by the
North Carolina court. Application of the first rule does not require
the adoption of the liberal view of cause of action. The results in the
cases when the second rule was applied, however, seem to be consistent
only with the view that an aggregate of operative facts giving rise to
one or more relations of right-duty constitutes the cause of action.
Under the first rule the North Carolina Supreme Court allowed the fol-
lowing amendments: (a) to perfect a statement of a cause of action for
divorce where the original complaint failed to to allege facts beyond
the language of the statute;18 (b) to perfect a statement of a good
cause of action for breach of contract where plaintiff failed to allege
readiness and ability to pay;14 (c) to perfect a statement of a cause of
action to recover embezzled money where plaintiff failed to allege clearly
that money received by the defendant was from that embezzled ;15
(d) to perfect the statement of a cause of action for wrongful death
by alleging the law of another state;16 (e) to perfect a cause of action
under the Federal Employer's Liability Act by alleging that the plaintiff
was employed in interstate commerce at time of injury.17 Under the
second rule the North Carolina Supreme Court has held that the fol-
lowing amendments did not change the cause of action: (a) to allege
permanent injury to land where plaintiff originally declared for injury
to crops ;18 (b) in an action to establish materialmen's liens, to allege an
agreement between owner and contractor whereby the owner agreed to
pay for materials and labor required to complete the building when the
contractor was financially unable to complete his contract after a referee
found that the owner had paid the contractor more than was due on the
contract price;19 (c) to allege fraud and deceit where original com-
41 Am. Jur., Pleading §305.
"'Ladd v. Ladd, 121 N. C. 118, 28 S. E. 190 (1897).
" Blalock v. Clark, 133 N. C. 306, 45 S. E. 642 (1903).5 Fidelity v. Jordan, 134 N. C. 236, 46 S. E. 496 (1904).
" Lassiter v. Norfolk & C. R. R., 136 N. C. 89, 48 S. E. 642 (1904) cited
supra note 8.1TRenn v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 170 N. C. 128, 86 S. E. 964 (1915). Twojudges dissented, contending that the original complaint stated a cause of action
at common law and the amendment stating a new cause of action should not be
allowed after the statute of limitations had run. On appeal to U. S. Supreme
Court this case was affirmed, holding that the amendment merely expanded or
amplified the original cause which was under the act of Congress. 241 U. S. 290,
36 S. Ct. 567, 60 L. ed. 1006 (1916).
"' Pickett v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R., 153 N. C. 148, 69 S. E. 8 (1910). "We
do not think the amendment added a new cause of action but related to quantum
of damages. The cause of action was the injury to the land, and the consequent
damages." Id. at 149, 69 S. E. at 9.
" Carolina Hardware Co. v. Raleigh Banking & Trust Co., 169 N. C. 744, 86
S. E. 706 (1915), "The policy of code procedure as to the allowance of amend-
ments is very liberal, the leading purpose being to have actions tried upon their
merit and avert a failure of justice." Id. at 747, 86 S. E. at 708.
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plaint was to recover purchase price of land because of defective title;2
(d) to allege facts raising an estoppel after referee found defendants
not liable in an action to collect on defendants' notes ;21 (e) in an action
for claim and delivery, to allege title by gift inter vivos where in the
original complaint plaintiff alleged title by virtue of an allotment in her
year's allowance as widow.m
On the grounds that a new cause of action would be stated the court
refused the following amendments: (a) to allege facts to recover the
penalty for usury where original action was to recover an overpayment
of interest made by mistake and ignorance,2 (b) in an action for
wrongful arrest and malicious prosecution in a court of the justice of
the peace, to allege that the defendant influenced and procured a bill
sent to the grand jury.24 On the same grounds the court refused to
allow the following amendments to relate back to the beginning of the
action: (a) to allege a contract between defendant and a third party
for the sale of logs, plaintiff to be paid a certain amount from the sale
of the timber sawed therefrom, where original action was based on a
sale and delivery of sawed timber ;25 (b) to allege a cause of action for
wrongful death under the statute of another state where the original
action was brought under the Federal Employers Liability Act ;26 (c) to
allege facts constituting negligence of defendant railroad where original
complaint stated facts showing co-defendant only was negligent.2
Many other illustrations could be cited, but these will suffice to demon-
strate the difficulty of determining the status the amendment will be
given.
Is it practicable to devise some tests to determine when an amend-
ment states a new cause of action? In Lumberimns Mutual Insurance
Co. v. Southern Ry 28 the court expressed approval of two such tests:
(1) inquire whether a recovery had upon the original complaint would
be a bar to any recovery under the amended complaint, or (2) whether
the amendment could have been cumulated with the original allegations.
Other tests have been devised, including: (1) Would the same evidence
2' Currie v. Malloy, 185 N. C. 206, 116 S. E. 564 (1923) ; Dockery v. Fair-
banks, 172 N. C. 529, 90 S. E. 501 (1916).
Bank of Ash v. Sturgill, 223 N. C. 825, 28 S. E. (2d) 511 (1943).
22 James v. James, 226 N. C. 399, 38 S. E. (2d) 168 (1946). There can be no
question that the court properly sustained the amendment. It seems, however,
that the court adopted the strict view of "cause of action" to achieve the usual
result of the liberal view. Here the court allowed a change in the statement of
facts.
" Gillam v. Life Ins. Co. of Va., 121 N. C. 369, 28 S. E. 470 (1897).
2' Cooper v. Southern Ry., 165 N. C. 578, 581, 81 S. E. 761, 763 (1914), "The
trial judge cannot, without consent of parties, so amend, change, or modify the
pleadings in a pending action as to substantially make it a new one."
2 Sams v. Price, 121 N. C. 392, 28 S. E. 486 (1897).
21 Capps v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R., 183 N. C. 181, 111 S. E. 533 (1922).
11 George v. Atlanta & C. A. L. Ry., 210 N. C. 58, 185 S. E. 431 (1936).28 179 N. C. 255, 260, 102 S. E. 417, 420 (1920).
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support both of the pleadings? (2) Is the measure of damages the
same in each case? (3) Are the allegations of each subject to the same
defenses?29 The desirability of such a simple solution is appreciated,
but even a cursory examination of the cases reveals that no such solu-
tion is readily attainable and that attempts to apply the suggested tests
give diverse results.30 The question so frequently boils down to one
of degree that each case must be considered on its own merits. Adopt-
ing the definition that an amendment which changes the cause of action
is one which alleges facts involving a transaction or situation other than
the one originally declared on, this test can be established: does the
amendment state facts involving a transaction or situation other than
the one in the original complaint? Such a test is necessarily general. A
similar determination, however, is required in applying the statute on
joinder of causes, 31 and in joinder of parties and causes questions.3 2
The North Carolina court actually applied this test in at least one case
involving amendments.33
The second question raised by the principal case is when will an
amendment that changes the cause of action be allowed. Allowance of
amendments has been a subject of legislation since the fourteenth cen-
tury. 4 The codes and statutes of the various jurisdictions have their
own particular rules.
While the North Carolina statute adopts a strict practice of amend-
ing by right,"6 it adopts a very liberal practice of allowing amendments
at the discretion of the trial court,36 having only two restrictions: (1) the
amendment will not be allowed if it is for the purpose of delay,37 and
(2) if the amendment is for the purpose of conforming the pleading to
2937 C. J., Limitations of Acts §512.
""After carefully appraising the suggested tests, one writer concludes: "The
result of these cases leads to the conclusion that no one rule can be set forth as a
general criterion; it is submitted, however, that a more nearly applicable test
would be: Does the amendment institute a matter materially different in substance
or historical form, thereby appreciably altering the primary rights and obligations
of the parties to the prejudice of the defendant?" Note (1928-29) 7 Tax. L. Ray.
144, 150.
'IN. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §1-123, "The plaintiff may unite in the same com-
plaint several causes of action, of legal or equitable nature, or both, where they all
arise out of-
1. The same transaction or transaction connected with the same subject of
action."
" Atkins v. Steed, 208 N. C. 245, 179 S. E. 889 (1935) ; Trust Co. v. Pierce,
195 N. C. 717, 143 S. E. 524 (1928).
's See note 43 infra.
8,14 Edw. III, c. 6 (1327-77); SHaIPMAN, CommoN-LAW PLEADING (Ballan-
tine, 3rd ed. 1923) §163.
' N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §1-161 ; see also §1-129.
"' From an examination of the cases, it has been found that the trial courts are
very liberal in their exercises of discretion. The few occasions where the court
refused the amendment was for the reason that the court belived it to be beyond
his discretionary powers.
"
T N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §1-161; see Biggs v. Moffitt, 218 N. C. 601, 11 S, E.
(2d) 870 (1940).
[Vol. 25
NOTES AND COMMENTS
the facts proved, it must not change substantially the claim or de-
fense.38 Even though the statute clearly avoids using the term "cause
of action," the court has generally construed the word "claim" to mean
"cause of action."' 9 A confusion of the rule was observed by Professor
McIntosh: "The statute permits an amendment in the discretion of the
court---'when the amendment does not change substantially the claim or
defense.' This is found in connection with the amendment to make the
pleading conform to the proof, but it has been applied generally to all
amendments made under order of court." 40  More recently, however, a
more liberal rule has been adopted which allows amendments stating a
new cause of action with the limitation that such amendments cannot
relate back to defeat the statute of limitations.41  Such a new cause
would necessarily have to comply with the joinder of causes statute,42
and there is some suggestion that this is true where the plaintiff attempts
a substitution.4 Even before this more liberal rule was established, the
court, on the theory that the cause of action was not changed, allowed
Il N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §1-163. For power of Supreme Court to amend see§7-13, discussed in Deligny v. Furniture Co., 170 N. C. 189, 86 S. E. 980 (1914).
8Lefler v. Lane, 170 N. C. 181, 183; 86 S. E. 1022, 1023 (1915), ".. . the
power of amendment has been very broadly conferred and may and ordinarily
should be exercised in 'furtherance of justice,' unless the effect is to add a new
cause of action or change the subject matter thereof. . . ." See also Hardware
Co. v. Banking Co., cited supra note 19. "It is well settled that the court cannot,
except by consent, allow an amendment which changes the pleadings so as to
make substantially a new action, . . ." citing Ely v. Early, 94 N. C. 1; Craven v.
Russell, 118 N. C. 564.
McINTosH, NORTH CAROLINA PRAcTICE AND PROCEDURE (1929) §487.
,Capps v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R., 183 N. C. 181, 187; 111 S. E. 533 (1922).
"It is the general rule, and consistently held with us, that a new cause of action
may be introduced by way of amendment to the original pleading; but established
limitation on the operation of its relation to the commencement of the suit is that
if the amendment introduce a new matter, or cause of action different from the one
propounded, and with respect to which the statute of limitations would then
operate as a bar, such defense or plea will have the same force and effect as if
the amendment were a new and independent suit."
Nassaney v. Culler, 224 N. C. 323, 30 S. E. (2d) 226 (1944) quotes the above
with approval and then distinguishes the amendment in this case as being not a
new and distinct cause of action.
By the language used in G. S. §1-164, the legislature clearly intended not to
forbid the introduction of a new cause of action by amendment. The section be-
gins: "When the complaint is so amended as to change the nature of the action
and the character of the relief demanded. . . ." It seems that the court had fre-
quently overlooked the implication of this language.
'
2 N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §1-123. Hatcher v. Williams, 225 N. C. 112, 114, 33
S. E. (2d) 617, 618 (1945). Action for an accounting. Plaintiff allowed to allege
fraud. "To say the amendment undertakes to join an action in tort with one on
contract in the same complaint is to regard the proceeding strictly as an action at
law rather than a suit in equity. Even so, they [the tort and contract] both arise
out of the same transaction, or transactions connected with the same subject of
action; G. S. 1-123. Where such is true, they may be joined in the same complaint."
' Reynolds v. Mt. Airy & Eastern Ry., 136 N. C. 345, 347, 48 S. E. 765, 766
(1904). "If the plaintiff could have added to his present cause of action another
one sounding in tort, why should he not be allowed to substitute the latter for the
former, as it will not be a new cause of action in any sense if it is one based upon
the same transaction or connected with the subject of the action."
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amendments to change the action from contract to tort,"4 and from law
to equity.45 Very soon after the code was adopted, the court recognized
that the test to determine a change in the cause of action was not the
test applied at common law to determine a change in the form of
action.46
Since one of the primary advantages plaintiffs seek in amending the
complaint is to avoid the statute of limitations, the liberality of the
court in allowing amendments is governed primarily by the determina-
tion of whether the amendment states a new cause of action. The
North Carolina court has generally regarded one wrongful act as creating
one cause of action and even in the face of a plea of the statute of
limitations has allowed plaintiff to amend to allege permanent injury to
land where the complaint alleged damages to crops 47 and to allege that
the injury occurred in interstate commerce where the complaint declared
only on negligence. 48 The court clearly rejected the argument that one
wrongful act causing damage to person and property of plaintiff creates
two causes of action, saying that the plaintiff cannot split his cause of
action exposing the defendant to the vexation of multiple suits. 49 These
decisions are illustrative of the liberal policy of the court and demon-
strate the court's determination to have cases justly determined on their
merits. With its liberality, however, the court refused to allow the
plaintiff to amend and recover under a state statute when the complaint
declared on a federal statute because the amendment stated a new cause
of action which was barred by the statute of limitations, even though
the injury was caused by one wrongful act.0 If the statute of limita-
tions has run, the North Carolina court would probably reach the same
result the West Virginia court reached in the principal case, even though
the amendment was offered in the pleading stage. Such a ruling would
seem, however, to be reverting back to the old days when changes in
the form of the action were forbidden. Whether plaintiff's injury is
due to defendant's common law negligence or to its breach of statutory
"Id.
'
5 Woodcock v. Bostic, 128 N. C. 244; 38 S. E. 881 (1901).
"Oates, etc. Co. v. Kendall, 67 N. C. 241 (1872).
' Pickett v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R., 153 N. C. 148, 69 S. E. 8 (1910), cited
supra note 18.
•
8 Renn v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 170 N. C. 128, 86 S. E. 964 (1915), cited
supra note 17.
', Eller v. Carolina & N. Ry., 140 N. C. 140, 52 S. E. 305 (1905) ; cf. Under-
wood v. Dooley, 197 N. C. 100, 147 S. E. 686 (1929).
"' Capps v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R., 183 N. C. 181, 111 S. E. 533 (1922),
Chief Justice Clark wrote a very strong dissent. In Fuquay v'. Atlantic & W.
Ry., 199 N. C. 499, 155 S. E. 167 (1930) the same theory of two causes of action
was followed to plaintiff's advantage. Here the court held that a previous trial
resulting in judgment of non-suit for failure to prove that the injury occurred in
interstate commerce as alleged was not res judicata against a second suit alleging
intrastate commerce. It would seem that the same result would be reached even
under the theory of one cause of action, the issue of negligence having not been
determined.
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duty in failing to properly maintain its streets, there has been one occur-
rence resulting in plaintiff's damage. Defendant's victory is not based
on a result of a determination of the case on its merits nor on the delay
of plaintiff in prosecuting his claim. It is based on plaintiff's failure to
select his proper remedy-strongly analogous to suing in trespass in-
stead of case.
The North Carolina amendment statutes are liberal. They are de-
signed to facilitate and expedite trials and at the same time preserve the
rights of the defendant. The rights of the defendant, however, should
not include technicalities giving the defendant an advantage. The pur-
pose of the statute of limitations is to prevent a plaintiff from taking
advantage of a defendant by instigating a claim arising out of a trans-
action or conduct which occurred so long before as to place the defendant
at a disadvantage in defeating the claim or defending himself. The
statute can be tolled by a summons sketchily defining the transaction or
conduct complained of:51 It would seem that the greatest liberality in
amending the pleading would be called for in this situation for the sake
of fairness to all parties. In speaking to this very point Mr. Justice
Holmes said, "Of course an argument can be made on the other side,
but when the defendant has had notice from the beginning that the plain-
tiff sets up and is trying to enforce a claim against it because of sped-
fied conduct, the reasons for the statute of limitations do not exist, and
we are of the opinion that a liberal rule should be applied."
52
It has been suggested that the desired liberality may be attained by
changing the rule rather than liberally defining the term "cause of
action." 53  Several states and the federal courts have done so.54  The
'Webster v. Sharpe, 116 N. C. 466, 21 S. E. 912 (1895).
" N. Y. Cent R. R. v. Kinney, 260 U. S. 340, 346, 43 S. Ct. 122, 123, 67 L. ed.
294, 296 (1922). The court allowed an amendment changing from state statute to
federal statute. Followed without opinion in McCabe v. Boston Terminal Co., 309
U. S. 624; 60 S. Ct. 725; 84 L. ed. 986 (1939).
"S Gavit, The Code Cause of Action (1930) 30 COL. L. Ray. 802, 819, "The
obvious remedy is not to change the definition of the 'cause of action,' but it is to
change the rule."
11FED. RULES CIV. PROC. (1938), Rule 15. Amendments and Supplemental
Pleadings.
ALA. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1928) §9513.
ILL. ANN. STAT. (Smith-Hurd, 1936) c. 110, §170(2). "The cause-of action
... set up in any amended pleading shall not be barred.., under any statute or
contract prescribing or limiting the time within which any action may be brought
or right asserted, if the time prescribed or limited had not expired when the
original pleading was filed and if it shall appear from the original and amended
pleading that the cause of action asserted ... in the amended pleading grew out
of the same transaction or occurrence set up in the original pleading. . . any such
amendment to any such pleading shall be held to relate back to the date of the
filing of the original pleading so amended." Illinois followed a very strict rule
prior to this statute. See 240 Ill. 259, 88 N. E. 651, commented on in (1927) 76
U. PA. L. Rav. 756.
2 WAsH. Rv. STAT. ANN. (Remington, 1932) §308-3. "A cause of action
which would not have been barred by the statute of limitations if stated in the
original complaint or counterclaim shall not be so barred if introduced by amend-
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North Carolina amendment statutes are closely in accord with the Fed-
eral Rules55 except in connection with the all important matter of rela-
tion back. The relation back provision of the Federal Rules is as
follows:
"15(c) Relation Back of Amendments. Whenever the claim or de-
fense asserted in the amended pleading arose out of the conduct, trans-
action, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original
pleading, the amendment relates back to the date of the original
pleading." 56
This rule does not defeat the legitimate use of the statute of limitations.
It does, however, prevent the defendant from defeating the plaintiff's
claim on a technicality in the pleading. This is the desired result and
avowed purpose of modem pleading. The adoption of the above pro-
vision from the Federal Rules by the North Carolina legislature would
clarify the present confusion on this issue and place the North Carolina
rules of pleading in accord with the liberal and just practice of modem
pleading.
WiLL AM A. DRas, JR.
Survival of Personal Injury Actions in North Carolina
In a recent case,1 the North Carolina Supreme Court held that
where a person is injured by the actionable negligence of another, and
later dies as the result of such injuries, a cause of action for consequen-
tial damages sustained by the injured person between the date of the
injury and the date of the death survives to the personal representative
of such deceased person. Prior to 1915, it was the unquestioned 2 law
of this jurisdiction that such causes of action did not survive. Causes
of action for personal injury not causing death were expressly denied
survival by the statute.8 It was held that the legislature, in denying
survival to causes of action where the injury did not cause the death
ment at any later stage of the action, if the adverse party was fairly apprised of
its nature by the original pleading, and that the plaintiff was claiming thereunder,
provided no new party is added thereby."
11Compare N. C. GEN. STAT. §1-161 with Fed. Rule 15(a); compare N. C.
GEN. STAT. §1-163 with Fed. Rule 15(b); compare N. C. GEN. STAT. §1-167 with
Fed. Rule 15(d) ; see Nassaney v. Culler, 224 N. C. 323, 30 S. E. (2d) 226 (1944);
cited supra note 10.
" Applied with approval in Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R., 323 U. S. 574,
65 S. Ct. 421, 89 L. ed. 465 (1944). See also MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE §15.08;
Notes (1944) 23 N. C. L. Ray. 141, 145; (1930) 40 YALE L. J. 311.
'Hoke v. Atlantic Greyhound Corp. et a[., 226 N. C. 332, 38 S. E. (2d) 105(1946).
2But cf. Peebles v. N. C. R. R., 63 N. C. 238 (1869). Prior to enactment of
survival statute, causes of action for personal injury were held to survive under
REvISED CODE (1868), c. 1, §1; now N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §1-22.8 N. C. REvisMA (1905) §157(2); now, as amended, N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943)
§28-175.
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and in creating a new cause of action by the wrongful death statute
where the injury did cause the death, intended to deny survival to all
causes of action for personal injury.4 An amendment in 19155 struck
from the list of actions denied survival the following: ". . . or other
injuries to the person where such injury does not cause the death of
the injured party." Prior to the principal case, it was held6 that under
the amendment causes of action for personal injury arising from a negli-
gent act, the injury not causing death, survived; and by obiter dicta that
all such causes of action for personal injury, regardless of the cause of
Aeath, would survive. In the principal case, the court following this
dicta and supported by a federal case7 in accord held that where a per-
son dies as the result of injuries sustained by the actionable negligence
of another, the right of action for personal injury existing in the de-
ceased at the time of death survives to the personal representative of
the deceased persons; the damages recoverable-i.e., such damages as were
sustained by the deceased during his lifetime-are an asset of the estate
to be administered as other property possessed by the deceased at his
death; and the survival of such right of action does not affect the
accrual of the cause of action under the wrongful death statute.
By a combination of the holdings of the two cases 8 construing the
survival statute as amended, and from the terms of the survival statute,e
it is clear that where a right of action exists as the result of injuries
sustained by negligence and either the injured person or the negligent
tortfeasor dies, the right of action for personal injury survives to or
against the personal representative of the deceased person. The death
of the tortfeasor, either before or after the accrual of a cause of action
for wrongful death, would not affect the death action due to the pro-
vision of the wrongful death statute that such actions can be maintained
against the personal representative of a deceased tortfeasor.10
The result of these two holdings, then, is to place rights of action
for personal injury within the terms of the general section1 ' rather than
the excepting section 12 of the survival statute. It follows, therefore,
that all rights of action for personal injury survive to and against the
personal representative unless otherwise denied survival by the statute.
'Edwards v. Interstate Chemical Co., 170 N. C. 551, 87 S. E. 635, L. R. A.
1916 D. 635 (1915); Watts v. Vanderbilt, 167 N. C. 567, 83 S. E. 813 (1914);
Bolick v. Southern Ry., 138 N. C. 370, 50 S. E. 689 (1905).
N. C. Pub. Laws 1915, c. 38.
'Fuquay v. A. & W. R. R., 199 N. C. 499, 155 S. E. 167 (1930).TJames Baird & Co. v. Boyd, 41 F. (2d) 578 (C. C. A. 4th, 1930).
'Hoke v. Atlantic Greyhound Corp., 226 N. C. 332, 38 S. E. (2d) 105 (1946);
Fuquay v. A. & W. R. Co., 199 N. C. 499, 155 S. E. 167 (1930).
' N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §§28-172 and 28-175.
"0 Tonkins v. Cooper, 187 N. C. 570, 122 S. E. 294 (1924).
'IN. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §28-172.11 N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §28-175.
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Since the excepting section denies survival to rights of action for assault
and battery,13 it would seem that rights of action for personal injury
arising out of an assault and battery would not survive. Whether this
will be held to extend to all wilful injury cases, and thereby limit the
present holdings to negligence cases, remains open for decision. If the
present holdings are so limited, there will probably be further legislation,
since it would seem unjust to allow survival against a negligent tort-
feasor and deny survival against a wilful tortfeasor.
The court went to pains to make it clear that the right of the injured
person to sue for personal injury of any kind was separate and distinct
from the right of the personal representative to sue under the right of
action conferred by the wrongful death statute. The former right is
personal to the deceased during his lifetime, and upon death survives
as an asset of his estate to his personal representative; while on the other
hand, the latter right accrues to the personal representative at the date
of death, not as an asset of the estate, but for the benefit of a particular
class of beneficiaries. It was further pointed out that although both
rights of action have as a basis the same wrongful act, there is no over-
lapping of damages recoverable since the measure of damages in each
case is determinable upon separate elements of damage. It will be noted
that the court refers to and distinguishes two rights of action. Does
this mean, as to the personal representative, that there is one cause of
action or two?
It is clear that the personal representative is the only person who
can sue on either claim,' 4 and there is but one wrongful act giving rise
to both claims. Furthermore, it is clear that ordinarily when two per-
sonal rights of the same person are infringed upon by the same wrong-
ful act but one cause of action exists.' 5 However, there are here
numerous grounds for distinction. The rights involved in the issue
at hand have separate and distinct sources, 16 each accrues as against
the tortfeasor at different times,' 7 each is subject to a different limita-
tion, 18 each recovery involves different elements of damage,' 9 each
" N. C. GE'. STAT. (1943) §28-175(2).
"
4 Personal injury: N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §28-172; Suskin v. Maryland
Trust Co., 214 N. C. 347, 199 S. E. 276 (1938). Wrongful death: Hanes v. South-
ern Pub. Util. Co., 191 N. C. 13, 131 S. E. 402 (1925); Hood v. Amer. Tel. &
Tel. Co., 162 N. C. 70, 77 S. E. 1096 (1913).
" Eller v. Carolina & N. W. R., 140 N. C. 140, 52 S. E. 305, 3 L. R. A. (N. S.)
225 (1905) ; cf. Underwood v. Dooly, 197 N. C. 100, 147 S. E. 686, 64 A. L. R.
656 (1929) (one cause of action exists, but insurer may sue on subrogation).
' h right against personal injury is a natural common law right, while the
right against death is purely statutory.
The personal injury action accrues at the date of the injury, while the death
action accrues at the date of death. Hoke v. Atlantic Greyhound Corp., 226 N. C.
332, 337, 38 S. E. (2d) 105, 109 (1946).
"'The injury action is subject to a three year limitation. N. C. GEtr. STAT.(1943) §1-52(5) ; while the death action must be commenced within one year of
the death as a condition precedent to the action, Curlee v. Duke Power Co., 205
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recovery is for a different purpose,2° and the decedent never possessed
the right to sue for wrongful death. 2' Furthermore, it is held that
rights given by a statute, as compared with natural rights or rights given
by other statutes, give rise to an independent cause of action.
2 2 It
would seem, therefore, that two causes of action exist.m
Assuming then, that two causes of action exist, may they be properly
joined in one action? In the principal case the two actions had been
joined, but this joinder was not questioned on appeal, and the court
made no comment thereon. Under the joinder statute,24 a joinder of
causes of action arising out of the same transaction is permissive. It is
evident that the causes of action in question arise out of the same trans-
action-i.e., the wrongful act of the tortfeasor-and could, therefore, be
joined. Question, however, might arise as to the joinder of the parties,
since the personal representative is suing in two different fiduciary
capacities 25 However, he is the only person permitted to maintain
either action. 28 It would seem that in view of the announced purpose
of allowing a joinder of all actions xisting between the parties when-
ever possible,27 the dual capacity of the personal representative would
not prevent a joinder of the actions, 28 since the dual capacity in itself
could not prejudice the defendant. There would also seem to be a
question as to the present standing of the line of cases holding that
the personal representative cannot, by amending a personal injury action
N. C. 644, 172 S. E. 329 (1933); Trull v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 151 N. C. 545,
66 S. E. 586 (1909).
" The damages recoverable in the injury action are those suffered by the in-jured party during his lifetime, Hoke v. Atlantic Greyhound Corp., 226 N. C.
332, 337, 38 S. E. (2d) 105, 109 (1946); while the damages recoverable in the
death action are the compensation for the injury resulting from the death. N. C.
GFN. STAT. (1943) §28-174.
2' The damages recovered in the injury action are an asset of the estate, Hoke
v. Atlantic Greyhound Corp., 226 N. C. 332, 337, 38 S. E. (2d) 105, 109 (1946) ;
while the damages recovered in the death action are for a particular class of
beneficiaries. N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §28-173.
21 Hoke v. Atlantic Greyhound Corp., 226 N. C. 332, 38 S. E. (2d) 105 (1946).
"'Fuquay v. A. & W. Ry., 199 N. C. 499, 155 S. E. 167 (1930); Capps v.
A. C. L. R. R., 183 N. C. 181, 111 S. E. 533 (1922).
2 "Murphy v. St. L. I. M. & S. R. R., 92 Ark. 159, 122 S. W. 636 (1909) ; Stew-
art v. Electric Light & Power Co., 104 Md. 332, 65 Atl. 49, 8 L. R. A. (N. S.) 384,
118 Am. St. Rep. 410 (1906); Bowen v. City of Boston, 155 Mass. 344, 29 N. E.
633, 15 L. I. A. 365 (1892) ; Gorman v. Columbus & So. Ohio Electric Co., 144
Ohio St. 593, 60 N. E. (2d) 700 (1944) ; May Coal Co. v. Robinette, 120 Ohio St.
110, 165 N. E. 576, 64 A. L. R. 441 (1929) ; Brown v. Chicago & N. W. R. R.,
102 Wis. 137, 77 N. W. 748, 44 L. R. A. 579 (1898).
'IN. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §1-123.
,' In the personal injury action he is suing for the benefit of the estate, while
in the death action he is suing for the benefit of a special class of beneficiaries.
See note 20 supra.
"See note 14 supra.
'*Gregory v. Hobbs, 93 N. C. 1 (1885); Hamlin v. Tucker, 72 N. C. 502
(18"Moyer v. City of Oshkosh, 151 Wis. 586, 139 N. W. 378 (1913) ; Nemecek
v. Filler & Stowell Co., 126 Wis. 71, 105 N. W. 225 (1905).
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commenced by the deceased, allege a cause of action for wrongful
death." When this rule was laid down, the action commenced by the
deceased abated at death, and the amendment was not a mere joining
of two causes of action but a substitution of one action for the other.
Today, since the personal representative may continue the suit com-
menced by his deceased, and the amendment would be a mere joining
thereto of the death action, it would seem that such joinder should be
allowed3 0 However, the date of the amendment would have to be
within one year of the death, as the death action could not date from the
comemncement of the prior action.31
If, then, there be two causes of action which may be joined, would
a recovery, release, or bar in one action by the personal representative
bar a recovery on the other action under the doctrine of res judicata?
It is well established in this jurisdiction and elsewhere that a recovery
or release by the injured person will bar the accrual of the death action. 2
This holding would not necessarily apply when the personal represent-
ative has recovered on one cause or has given a release, since the basis
of the former holding was laid on the terms of the wrongful death
statute and not on res judicata.3 A judgment is decisive between the
parties as to all points raised by the pleadings, or which might properly
be predicated upon them,34 but this does not embrace any matter which
might have been brought into the litigation, or any causes of action
which might have been joined, but which in fact were neither joined nor
embraced in the pleadings.85 In order to support a plea of res judicata,
there must be identity of parties, subject matter, and issues.30 The
court in the principal case clearly pointed out that the issue of damage
"p Edwards v. Interstate Chemical Co., 170 N. C. 551, 87 S. E. 635, L. R. A.
1916D 121 (1915) ; Bolick v. Southern Ry., 138 N. C. 370, 50 S. E. 689 (1905).
"' The cases cited supra note 29 have language to the effect that a joinder
would not be possible since the death action has not accrued at the commencement
of the prior action; however, the court has held that this fact would not in itself
preclude such an amendment, provided the pleadings as amended do not allege a
wholly distinct claim which does not stem out of the original transaction. Nassaney
v. Culler, 224 N. C. 323, 30 S. E. (2d) 226 (1944).
1 1 Ibid.
", Edwards v. Interstate Chemical Co., 170 N. C. 551, 87 S. E. 635, L. R. A.
1916D 121 (1915); see TIFFANY, DEATH BY WRONGFUL Acr (2nd ed.) §124, and
cases there cited. But see Schumacher, Rights of Action Under Death and Sur-
v2val Statutes (1924) 23 MIcH. L. Rav. 114, 119.
"' Edwards v. Interstate Chemical Co., 170 N. C. 551, 87 S. E. 635, L. R. A.
1916D 121 (1915) (the terms of the wrongful death statute ". .. such as would, if
the injured party had lived, have entitled him to an action for damages therefor"
require the existence of a right of action in the deceased at the date of death as
a condition precedent to the accrual of the action).
" Jefferson v. Southern Land Sales Corp., 220 N. C. 76, 16 S. E. (2d) 462(1941); Burton v. Carolina Light & Power Co., 217 N. C. 1, 6 S. E. (2d) 822
(1939).
",Stancil v. Wilder, 222 N. C. 706, 24 S. E. (2d) 527 (1942) ; Whitaker v. Gar-
ren, 167 N. C. 658, 83 S. E. 759 (1914) ; Ledwick v. Penny, 158 N. C. 104, 73 S. E.
228 (1911).8 Leary v. Va.-Car. Land Bank, 215 N. C. 501, 2 S. E. (2d) 570 (1939).
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in each case is determinable upon separate and distinct elements of dam-
age, and there could be no overlapping of damages recoverable. There-
fore, it would seem that unless the pleadings in the action brought by
the personal representative embraced all the points necessary for de-
termining the elements of damage in both actions, and all the elements
were submitted on the issue of damages, there would be no identity of
issues.8 7 However, it is clear that the issues determined in the action
would be not open to question in the second action.38 It follows, there-
fore, that an adverse verdict on the issue of negligence would bar the
second action. The effect of a release by the personal representative
would depend upon the terms of the release, and whatever rights were
released in the contemplation of the parties would be barred.39 Fur-
thermore, as to the personal representative, it would seem that neither
the bar of the statute of limitations on the personal injury action nor
the failure to bring the wrongful death action within one year of the
death would bar a recovery on the other action, since each action is
separate and distinct, and subject to a different limitation.49 It follows
therefore, that a recovery, release or bar as to either of the causes of
action by the personal representative will not bar a recovery on the
other cause of action under the doctrine of res judicata .41
Inquiring further into the nature of the surviving action, is a cause
of action for personal injury, standing alone, an asset in this jurisdiction
such as would support the establishment of an ancillary administration
of a deceased nonresident injured within this jurisdiction? It has been
repeatedly held that the cause of action for wrongful death is an asset
which will support the establishment of an ancillary administration.42
The basis of this holding is laid on the premise that, although the re-
covery in the wrongful death action is not an asset of the estate, to hold
otherwise would defeat the purpose of the statute. The same result
would more logically follow as to the cause of action surviving under
the survival statute since the recovery thereon is an asset of the estate.
Furthermore, a cause of action for personal injury is a chose in action ; 4
Connor v. Connor, 223 N. C. 664, 28 S. E. (2d) 240 (1943).
"Leary v. Va.-Car. Land Bank, 215 N. C. 501, 2 S. E. (2d) 570 (1939).
*0 Electric Supply Co. v. Burgess, 223 N. C. 97, 25 S. E. (2d) 390 (1943);
Merrimon v. Postal Tel. & Cable Co., 207 N. C. 101, 176 S. E. 246 (1934).
,' See note 18 supra.
'Murphy v. St. L. I. M. & S. R. R., 92 Ark. 159, 122 S. W. 636 (1909) ; Stew-
art v. United Electric Light & Power Co., 104 Md. 332, 65 Atl. 49, 8 L. R. A. (N.
S.) 384, 118 Am. St. Rep. 410 (1906) ; Mahoning Valley Ry. v. Van Alstine, 77
Ohio St. 395, 83 N. E. 601, 14 L. R. A. (N. S.) 893 (1908) ; see Brown v. Chicago
& N. W. R. R., 102 Wis. 137, 77 N. W. 748, 44 L. R. A. 579 (1898).
"' Farn v. N. C. R. R., 155 N. C. 136, 71 S. E. 81 (1911) ; Vance v. R. R.,
138 N. C. 460, 50 S. E. 860 (1905).
"' Northern Texas Traction Co. v. Hill, - Tex. Civ. App. - , 297 S. W.
778 (1927); Sharp v. Cincinnati N. 0. & T. P. Ry., 133 Tenn. 1, 179 S. W. 375(1915).
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a chose in action44 or a right of action is property ;45 and property is an
asset.46 Thus whether the court follow its result as to the wrongful
death action or apply the foregoing logic, it would seem that a cause
of action for personal injury, standing alone, is an asset which will
support the establishment of an ancillary administration.
If the court should not reach this result, it would seem that a right
of action surviving under the statute to a nonresident would be of no
value if service or recovery could not be had elsewhere. It is clear that
where a right of action for personal injury accrues in a state other than
the domicil of the deceased, the law of the scene of the injury decides
whether there is a survival of the right of action.47 Since a personal
injury action is transitory,48 if the action survive, it may be prosecuted
in a state other than the scene of the injury, and that state will enforce
the right provided jurisdiction may be had of all the necessary parties,
and the enforcement of such right is not contrary to the public policy
of the forum 49 or the laws of the forum are not so different from the
laws of the scene of the injury as to work an injustice on the defend-
ant.50 It is evident, therefore, that where a nonresident is injured in
this jurisdiction and later dies, and either service cannot be obtained on
the tortfeasor in the domiciliary state, or the laws of that state are such
that there can be no recovery on the surviving right of action, the per-
sonal representative must proceed either in this state, where the right
accrued, or in some state where service and recovery may be had. Since
a foreign administrator or executor cannot sue in this jurisdiction,5 1 it
would be necessary for ancillary administration to be established here.
Finally, what is the measure of consequential damages recoverable?
The court in broad terms lays down the general measure: those damages
resulting to the deceased during his lifetime.52 The court made it clear,
however, that the various elements of the consequential damages con-
stitute but one cause of action.53 The elements of damage would seem
"'Ibid.; In re Morace, 111 Md. 372, 74 At. 375 (1909).
"' Chubbuck v. Holloway, 182 Minn. 225, 234 N. W. 314 (1931); Loucks v.
Standard Oil Co., 224 N. Y. 99, 120 N. E. 189 (1918).
46 See "Assets," BLACK'S LAW DICT ONARY (3rd ed. 1933), p. 153. In general
see 4 WoRDs AND PHRASES, p. 464; 21 Am. JuR., p. 475.
"I Chubbuck v. Holloway, 182 Minn. 225, 234 N. W. 314 (1931); Potter v.
First Nat. Bank of Morristown, 107 N. J. Eq. 72, 151 Atl. 546 (1930) ; see BME,
THE CoNFLIcr OF LAWS (1935) §309.1.
4MacGovern & Co. v. A. C. L. R. R., 180 N. C. 219, 104 S. E. 534 (1920).
Chubbuck v. Holloway, 182 Minn. 225, 234 N. W. 314 (1931). But see
Clough v. Gardiner, 111 Misc. 244, 182 N. Y. S. 803 (1920).
"' Higgins v. N. Y. & N. E. R. R., 155 Mass. 176, 29 N. E. 534, 31 Am. St.
Rep. 544 (1892); Rodwell v. Camel City Coach Co., 205- N. C. 292, 171 S. E. 100
(1933).
'Hall v. Southern Ry., 149 N. C. 108, 65 S. E. 899 (1908) ; Monfils v. Hazle-
wood, 218 N. C. 215, 10 S. E. (2d) 67 (1940) (such holding does not abridge
U. S. CoUst.).
"Hoke v. Atlantic Greyhound Corp., 226 N. C. 332, 38 S. E. (2d) 105 (1946).
Id. at 338, 8 S. E. (2d) at 110.
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to include actual expenses for nursing and medical service; loss of in-
come;64 suffering, both mental and physical ;55 and any other injury
which naturally and directly are proximate consequences of the wrong-
ful actS6 and which are not elements of damage in the death action.
Punitive damages should not be awarded. 7 If there were an injury to
the property of the injured person as a result of the wrongful act, such
property damages must be recovered in the same action with the per-
sonal injury damages." It would seem that such elements of damage
as permanency of injuries and loss of earning capacity would not be
included since these elements are a part of the elements of damage
resulting from the death.0 It is clear that neither interest 6° nor attorney
fees"' are recoverable as damages.
Only those questions which it is felt the court will of necessity be
called upon to answer in the near future have been brought within the
scope 'of this note. Since the principal case clarifies the existence of a
cause of action which prior to 1915 did not exist and since 1915 evi-
dently was not understood by the bar to exist, it is certain that many
other questions will be presented for determination.
Louis J. PoissoN, JR.
Gifts of Corporate Stock-Transfer on Corporation Books
to Donor and Donee Jointly
In Buffaloe v. Barnes' a purchaser of 70 shares of corporate stock
directed that the certificate be issued in the names of himself and his
niece "as joint tenants with right of survivorship, and not as tenants in
common." He told the broker handling the transaction that he wanted
it that way so that if he pre-deceased her it would belong outright to
her, and if she pre-deceased him it would belong outright to him. The
certificate was delivered to him and was found at his death in his safety
deposit box. A dividend check payable to both had been indorsed by
her and delivered to him. Alleging a gift inter vivos, she -claimed the
shares as survivor in the joint tenancy. In an action by the executor
"Ledford v. Valley River Lumber Co., 183 N. C. 614, 112 S. E. 421 (1922);
Rushing v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 149 N. C. 158, 62 S. E. 890 (1908).
r' Britt v. Carolina Northern R. R., 148 N. C. 37, 61 S. E. 601 (1908), rehear-
ing denied, 149 N. C. 581, 64 S. E. 1135 (1908) (physical injury must accompany
mental suffering).
"Lane v. Southern Ry., 192 N. C. 287, 134 S. E. 855, 51 A. L. R. 1114 (1926).
17 Rippey v. Miller, 33 N. C. 247 (1850).
5 See note 15 supra.
Poe v. Raleigh & A. A. L. R. R., 141 N. C. 525, 54 S. E. 406 (1906) ; Burton
v. Wilmington R. R., 82 N. C. 505 (1880).
" Penny v. A. C. L. R. R., 161 N. C. 523, 77 S. E. 774, Ann. Cas. 1914D 992(1913).
81 Crutchfield v. Foster, 214 N. C. 551, 200 S. E. 395 (1938).
1226 N. C. 313, 38 S. E. (2d) 222 (1946), petition to rehear denied, 226 N. C.
app. (Oct. 9, 1946).
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to determine title to the 70 shares, heard on an agreed statement of
facts, the parties conceded that she was entitled to one half of the stock
in any event. The trial judge's ruling, based on the agreed facts, that
she had title to all the stock was reversed on appeal, two justices dis-
senting. The court said that the facts agreed upon were insufficient to
support that conclusion; that "it would not seem to follow [from the
agreed facts] as a necessary conclusion of law that a present gift was
intended."
The well known general requirements for making a valid gift of
personalty are donative intent, delivery, and acceptance. 2 Where the
subject of the gift is capable of manual delivery, actual delivery is neces-
sary to consummate a gift; otherwise there must be such delivery as
the nature of the property and the surrounding circumstances reason-
ably permit, clearly showing the donor's intention to part with title and
possession and vest the same in the donee.3 In cases where manual
delivery is impossible or impracticable, delivery may be symbolical or
constructive.4 A delivery is symbolical when another object or token
representing the property is handed over instead of the thing itself.5 A
constructive delivery is delivery of the means of obtaining possession
and control of the subject matter of the gift, or the relinquishment in
any manner to the donee of the donor's control and dominion over the
property. A simple example of constructive delivery is a gift of prop-
erty that is locked away by a delivery of the key.8
It is agreed that delivery need not necessarily be directly to the
donee. It may be to a third person for him,7 or the donor may con-
stitute himself trustee for the donee.8 Another rule is that the gift must
be fully executed in the present, and not be intended to take effect in
the future.9 But if a valid gift be made, the fact that the donee's enjoy-
ment of the gift is postponed until some future time, and that the donor
retains possession to receive the income from the property during his
lifetime do not invalidate the gift.'0 Acceptance of the gift is generally
held to be a requisite,"1 but acceptance of a gift beneficial to the donee
will be presumed.' 2
224 Am. JuR., Gifts §§21, 24, 40; BRowx, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PER-
soxAL PaoPERrY (1936 ed.) §37.
' Hudgens v. Tillman, 227 Ala. 672, 151 So. 863 (1933).
'Newman v. Bost, 122 N. C. 524, 29 S. E. 848 (1898) ; Brown, op. cit. supra
note 2, §41.
'Lavender v. Pritchard, 3 N. C. 337 (1805).
'Newman v. Bost, cited supra note 3; Brown, op. cit. supra note 2.
"Payne v. Tobacco Trading Corp., 179 Va. 156, 18 S. E. (2d) 281 (1942).
8 38 C. J. S., Gifts §26.
'Pomerantz v. Pomerantz, 179 Md. 436, 19 A. (2d) 713 (1941).
" Smith v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 59 F. (2d) 533 (C. C. A. 9th,
1932) ; Lynch v. Lynch, 124 Cal. App. 454, 12 P. (2d) 741 (1932).
124 Am. Jua., Gifts §40.1 Grissom v. Sternberger, 10 F. (2d) 764 (C. C. A. 4th, 1926).
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The law applies these same age-sanctioned rules to gifts of choses
in action, including corporate stock, although much difficulty is encoun-
tered due to the dissimilarity in subject matter.1 s Therefore, a gift of
stock may be made by delivery of the certificate with or without indorse-
ment to the donee, if a present gift be intended.14 The usual statutory
provision that transfer be made on the corporation books is uniformly
considered to be for the benefit of the corporation only, and does not
affect the validity of the gift as between the parties.' 5
The conflict in the decisions arises over the question whether trans-
fer on the corporation books without delivery of the certificate to the
donee can constitute constructive delivery sufficient to pass title."8 With
no outside evidence of delivery in its traditional sense available, the
question of donative intent becomes vital.' 7 An examination of the
cases discloses that the results reached reflect in most instances the
varying amounts of evidence present either supporting or negativing the
existence of donative intent.'8 For this reason it clarifies the problem
to classify the cases according to whether or not they contain evidence
regarding donative intent.'0
1 See Mechem, Gifts of Corporation Shares (1925) 20 ILL L. REv. 9.
" Grissom v. Sternberger, 10 F. (2d) 764 (C. C. A. 4th, 1926); Jones v.
Waldroup, 217 N. C. 178, 7 S. E. (2d) 366 (1940).15Cases cited supra note 14.1 Annotations: 99 A. L. R. 1080; 152 A. L. R. 427.11Ball v. Forbes, 314 Mass. 200, 49 N. E. (2d) 898 (1943).18Cases cited infra note 19.
10 Cases upholding gifts containing evidence of donative intent:
Gifts to donor and donee jointly: Abegg v. Hirst, 144 Iowa 196, 122 N. W. 838
(1909) ; Bunker v. Fidelity National Bank and Trust Co., 335 Mo. 305, 73 S. W.
2d) 242 (1934); Benton v. Smith, - Mo. App. - , 171 S. W. (2d) 767
(1943); Jones v. Waldroup, 217 N. C. 178, 7 S. E. (2d) 366 (1940); In re
Hutchison's Estate, 120 Ohio St. 542, 166 N. E. 687 (1929) ; Simonton v. Dwyer,
167 Ore. 50, 115 P. (2d) 316 (1941).
Gifts of entire ownership: Jean v. Jean, 207 Cal. 115, 277 Pac. 313 (1929);
Lynch v. Lynch, 124 Cal. App. 454, 12 P. (2d) 741 (1932) ; Thomas v. Thomas, 70
Colo. 29, 197 Pac. 243 (1921) ; Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Ward, 332 Ill. 126,
163 N. E. 319 (1928); In re Dayton's Estate, 121 Neb. 402, 237 N. W. 303
(1931) ; In re Brady's Estate, 228 App. Div. 56, 239 N. Y. Supp. 5 (1930) ; Crouse
v. Judson, 41 Misc. 338, 84 N. Y. Supp. 755 (1903) ; Ellsworth v. Ellsworth, 151 S.
W. (2d) 628 (Tex. 1941) ; Payne v. Tobacco Trading Corp., 179 Va. 156, 18 S. E.
(2d) 281 (1942); Moore v. Van Tassell, 58 Wyo. 121, 126 P. (2d) 9 (1942).
Cases upholding gifts where there was no evidence regarding donative intent
except the transfer on the corporation books:
Gifts to donor and donee jointly: Irvine v. Helvering, Commissioner of In-
ternal Revenue, 99 F. (2d) 265 (C. C. A. 8th, 1938) ; Eisenhardt v. Lowell, 105
Colo. 417, 98 P. (2d) 1001 (1940) ; In re Martin's Estate, 266 S. W. 750 (Mo.
App. 1924); East Rutherford Savings, Loan & Bldg. Assn. v. McKenzie, 87 N. J.
Eq. 375, 100 Atl. 931 (1917) ; Manning v. United States National Bank of Port-
land, 174 Ore. 118, 148 P. (2d) 255 (1944).
Gifts of the entire ownership: Marshall v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
57 F. (2d) 633 (C. C. A. 6th, 1932); Whitney v. Whitney Elevator & Warehouse
Co., 121 Misc. 461, 200 N. Y. Supp. 792 (1923) ; Francis v. New York and B. E.
Ry., 108 N. Y. 93, 15 N. E. 192 (1888); Sparks v. Hurley, 208 Pa. 166, 57 Alt. 364,
101 Am. St. Rep. 926 (1904); Robert's Appeal, 85 Pa. 84 (1877); Copeland v.
Craig, 193 S. C. 484. 8 S. E. (2d) 858 (1940) ; Phillips v. Plastridge, 107 Vt. 267,
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The theory of some of the cases ruling the gifts invalid is that the
transfer on the books is ineffective unless the certificate be delivered to
the donee, on the view that as long as the owner holds the certificate
he retains dominion and control over the stock and can revoke the gift
at will; that it is an attempt to make a gift to take effect in futuro.2
They say that, as far as appears, the owner had the transfer made for
his own convenience rather than as a gift, and there is no evidence that
he intended a present irrevocable transfer of title.21 But ignificantly,
in most of the cases holding this way there was evidence tending to
show that there was actually no donative intent, which was the con-
trolling element; although some of them also stated that even if a gift
was intended, this transaction was ineffective as delivery.22 Moreover,
a fair proportion of these opinions declared that transfer on the books
would have been a perfectly good way to make delivery except for the
absence of donative intent.23
For example, in Besson v. Stevens24 every indication was that the
donor did not intend a present irrevocable gift, and it was accordingly
held that such transfer was not delivery and that the donor could have
revoked the gift at any time and compelled the company to re-transfer
the stock to him. But the court said that that case was not inconsistent
with an earlier New Jersey case 25 which upheld a similar transfer to
donor and donee jointly where there was nothing to disprove donative
179 Atl. 157, 99 A. L. R. 1074 (1935) ; In re King's Estate, 49 Wyo. 453, 57 P.
(2d) 675 (1936).
Cases denying the validity where there was evidence disproving donative
intent:
Southern Industrial Institute v. Marsh, 15 F. (2d) 347 (C. C. A. 5th, 1926);
Hudgens v. Tillman, 227 Ala. 672, 151 So. 863 (1933); Hart v. Hart, 272 Ky.
488, 114 S. W. (2d) 747 (1938); White v. White, 17 S. W. (2d) 733 (Ky.
1929); Bauernschmidt v. Bauernschmidt, 97 Md. 35, 54 Atl. 637 (1903) (joint
ownership) ; Dover Cooperative Bank v. Tobin's Estate, 86 N. H. 209, 166 At.
247 (1933); Zimmerman v. Naubauser, 119 N. J. Eq. 424, 183 Atl. 820 (1936);
Crane v. I. Seymour Crane, Inc., 100 N. J. Eq. 400, 135 At. 782 (1927) ; Besson
v. Stevens, 94 N. J. Eq. 549, 120 AtI. 640 (1923) ; Reiley v. Fulper, 93 N. J. Eq.
112, 115 Atl. 661 (1921); Frazier v. Oklahoma Gas & Electric Co., 178 Okla. 512,
63 P. (2d) 11 (1936) ; Figuers v. Sherrell, 181 Tenn. 87, 178 S. W. (2d) 629, 152
A. L. R. 420 (1944) ; Swan v. Swan's Ex'r, 136 Va. 496, 117 S. E. 858 (1923).
Cases denying the validity of gifts where there was no- evidence regarding
donative intent:
Speaker v. Keating, 122 F. (2d) 706 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1941) ; Witthoft v. Com-
mercial Development & Investment Co., 46 Idaho 313, 268 Pac. 31 (1928) ; Getchell
v. Biddeford Savings Bank, 94 Me. 452, 47 Atl. 895, 80 Am. St. Rep. 408 (1900);
Matter of Crawford, 113 N. Y. 560, 21 N. E. 692, 5 L. R. A. 71 (1889).
'0 See note 19 supra. 21 Id.
22 Id. 2Id.
2, 94 N. J. Eq. 549, 120 At. 640 (1923) (corporation president transferred
stock to daughter on books, certificate remaining in cqmpany safe; he took an
assignment back from her with an irrevocable power of attorney for him to trans-
fer the stock on the books to him or his nominee; told her he had "put it in her
name," wanted it to come back to him if she died first, and at his death to come
back to the estate to enable equal distribution to all children).
"
5East Rutherford Savings, Loan & Bldg. Assn. v. McKenzie, 87 N. J. Eq.
375, 100 Atl. 931 (1913).
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intent; perhaps implying that gifts of joint estates are exempt from the
rule announced in the Besson case. In a Virginia case where the show-
ing was clearly against donative intent26 the court held that it was not a
gift, but declared that this transaction was exactly the right way to pass
title, making the donee prima facie owner; and in the absence of proof
contrary to donative intent the latter would be entitled to it. Other
cases presented in the footnote involve similar situations2 7
A few of the opinions cited in the principal case involved joint bank
deposits, 28 which have been even more fruitful of litigation than stock
transfers.29 In one case where the evidence was that no executed gift
was intendedsm the court said that such a deposit certificate was prima
fade evidence of donative intent, and, in the absence of facts disprov-
ing it, would be sufficient delivery make a valid gift.' A Massachusetts
case said that the transaction with the bank would constitute delivery
and effect a present gift if that result were intended; but that it was
still open to the donor's executor to show by attendant facts and circum-
stances that a present gift was not intended.8
2
Four cases were found ruling .the gifts invalid where there were no
facts disproving donative intent, two of them being stock transfersPa
" Swan v. Swan's Ex'r, 136 Va. 496, 117 S. E. 858 (1923) (husband trans-
ferred stock to his wife and kept certificate, voted stock, collected dividends,
listed it among his assets, made a will attempting to dispose of income from it,
and erased the "s" from "Mrs." in the certificate).
" Southern Industrial Institute v. Marsh, 15 F. (2d) 347 (C. C. A. 5th, 1926)
(shareholder directed transfer on corporation books but had the company return
the certificate to him because he wanted to deliver it personally and exact an
agreement from the donee reserving the dividends for life; he died before delivery).
Hudgens v. Tillman, 227 Ala. 672, 151 So. 863 (1933) (stockholder threatened
with alimony suit transferred stock to daughter's name, sent certificate to son-in-
law with letter disclaiming donative intent, asking latter to keep both in his safety
deposit box and tell no one).
Figuers v. Sherrell, 181 Tenn. 87, 178 S. W. (2d) 629, 152 A. L. R. 420 (1944)
(bank shareholder had certificate issued in nephew's name, kept certificate, had
bank deliver dividend checks and a stock dividend to him, voted and pledged stock,
signing nephew's name to dividend checks, proxy, assignment, and power of at-
torney, all unknown to nephew). Similar evidence is found in the cases disallow-
ing gifts in cases cited supra note 19.
£s Jones v. Fullbright, 197 N. C. 274, 148 S. E. 229 (1929) ; Nannie v. Pollard,
205 N. C. 362, 171 S. E. 341 (1933) ; Thomas v. Houston, 181 N. C. 91, 106 S. E.
466 (1921).
"9 See Harold C. Havighurst, Gifts of Bank Deposits (1936) 14 N. C. L. R-v.
129; annotations: 48 A. L. R. 189; 66 A. L. P. 881; 103 A. L. R. 1123; 135
A. L. R. 993, 149 A. L. R. 879.
"Trenton Saving Fund Society v. Byrnes, 110 N. J. Eq. 617, 160 Atl. 831
(1932).1 Id.
s2Ball v. Forbes, 314 Mass. 200, 49 A. (2d) 898 (1943).
Speaker v. Keating, 122 F. (2d) 706 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1941) (a mother assigned
mortgages to herself and daughter as joint tenants, had them recorded and kept
them, taking from the daughter an authority to collect interest); Witthoft v.
Commercial Development and Investment Co., 46 Idaho 313, 268 Pac. 31 (1928)
(shareholder had certificates issued in names of various relatives and gave them
to. a business associate, telling him "I want you to be my trustee, and in case of
death deliver these to the parties they are made out to"; they were kept in safe
1946]
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The leading case is Getchell v. Biddeford Saings Bank,3 4 which stated
that as far as appeared the transfer was made for the donor's own con-
venience, or so that the donee might receive it after his death; and that
if a gift was intended it was. not perfected by delivery.
On the other hand there are numerous cases sustaining such gifts on
the ground that transfer on the books is the equivalent of constructive
delivery.8 5 In about half of them the facts showed donative intent,
whereas in the rest there was again, merely the written transaction with
the corporation, without any declarations or conduct on the part -of. the
donor showing what had been his intention in directing the transfer.80
The North Carolina court sustained the survivor's right to the stock
under a transfer quite similar to that in the instant case in Jones v.
Waldroup, where, however, there was donative intent shown and the
certificates were in the possession of the donee3 7 The court observed
that Taylor v. Smith88 decided that a joint tenancy in personalty with
right of survivorship may be created by contract,39 and it construed the
Waldroup transaction as creating a joint tenancy with survivorship.
Further, our court has held that a gift may be made presently passing
title to the principal of a note without actual delivery, the donor keeping
the note to collect the interest for life.40 It was said there that the fact
that the donee's enjoyment of the gift was postponed until the donor's
death did not render the gift revocable or testamentary.
A case on all fours with the principal case is Eisenhardt v'. Lowell,41
where the Colorado court upheld the gift, saying that the "unequivocal
to which both had access) ; Getchell v. Biddeford Savings Bank, 94 Me. 452, 47
AtI. 895, 50 Am. St. Rep. 408 (1900) ; Matter of Crawford, 113 N. Y. 560, 21 N. E.
692, 5 L. R. A. 71 (1889) (bearer bonds were registered in donee's name, donor
retaining certificate and collecting interest).
" 94 Me. 452, 47 AtI. 895, 80 Am. St. Rep. 408 (1900) (a bank officer and
stockholder had certificates issued in his wife's name, keeping them in the bank
vault, drawing dividends and receipting for them in his own name, it not appear-
ing that she knew of the transaction; after her death he induced the bank to re-
issue them to him.. Held,.her estate was not entitled to the stock).
"'See note 19 supra.
" See note 19 supra.
.T217 N. C. 178, 7 S. E. (2d) 366 (1940) (certificates were issued to "R. M.
Waldroup or H. L. Waldroup," his wife; witnesses testified that he had made
declarations of gift, and there was testimony that the stock had been purchased
with the donee's funds).
38 116 N. C. 531, 21 S. E. 202 (1895).
31Id. It was held there that the statute [N. C. GEr. STAT. (1943) §41-2]
abolishing survivorship in joint tenancies does not prohibit persons from contract-
ing as to personalty so as to make the future rights of the parties depend on the
fact of survivorship.
That such a joint tenancy may be created by conveyance from one to himself
and another, see Irvine v. Helvering, 99 F. (2d) 265 (C. C. A. 8th, 1938).
,Parker v. Mott, 181 N. C. 435, 107 S. E. 500, 25 A. L. R. 637 (1921).
4 105 Colo. 417, 98 P. (2d) 1001 (1940) (stockholder surrendered his certif-
icate to the corporation and had it re-issued to himself and wife "as joint tenants
with right of survivorship, and not as tenants in common"; it was delivered to
him and found in his safety deposit box after his death, with no indication that
the wife knew of it).
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declarations" in the certificate are prima facie evidence of donative in-
tent, and in the absence of contrary proof vest a present right in the
stock in the donee, even though the right of enjoyment of the whole is
postponed.42 A South Carolina case, Copeknd v. Craig,43 is also iden-
tical with the principal case, except that the gift was entire instead of
joint, and the court there ruled in favor of the gift. It was said in a
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals decision: "Even if the certificates were
not delivered to the new shareholders, the transfers on the books were
sufficient to vest the title in the new owners if made by Von Ruck with
that intention." 44  And the Vermont court in Phillips v. Plastridge4"
upheld the gift even though the certificate was not detached from the
stock book and remained in the corporation's custody.40 Thus in all of
the cases examined where there were no signposts pointing in either
direction to aid in the search for intent, only a very few ruled against
the gift.47 Of these only two involved stock transfers, and in neither of
them was it a transfer in joint ownership.
In all this quarrel over delivery it is appropriate to recall what func-
tion delivery has traditionally been supposed to serve; namely, to be
the operation whereby the donor parts with title and dominion and vests
them in the donee.48 In view of this, it is suggested that the rule in
Eisenhardt v. Lowell, supra, that transfer on the books in joint owner-
ship is valid constructive delivery, adequately accomplishes this pur-
pose, especially because of the nature of the joint estate created.49
The transfer on the corporation books is not a barren transaction.
As between the corporation and the transferee the latter comes into
privity with the corporation and assumes the status of a shareholder,
having the right to vote in the control of the corporation and share in
42 Id.
Is 193 S. C. 484, 8 S. E. (2d) 858 (1940) (a father had his certificate re-issued
in his daughter's name, and the certificate was found in his safety deposit box at
his death; she indorsed dividend checks to him, as in the principal case).
" Schoenheit v. Lucas, 44 F. (2d) 476, 487 (C. C. A. 4th, 1930).
'5 107 Vt. 267, 179 Ad. 157, .99 A. L. R. 1074 (1935) (a father transferred
stock to daughter's name without her knowledge, no other evidence appearing).
"Id. The court said, "Phillips had divested himself of all right and title to
the stock, and the complete ownership had passed to his daughter. It was his
voluntar.y act, affording an inference of the existence of donative intent.'
In Simonton v. Dwyer, 167 Ore. 50, 115 P. (2d) 316 (1941) (a father retained
certificates taken out in children's names) in holding it a valid gift the court
said that by the transfer the donor "thereby irrevocably placed the stock beyond
his control.... He thus placed himself in a position that any interference by him
with the stock without the consent of the plaintiffs would be unauthorized and
unlawful."
'7 See note 33 supra.
,s See Mechem, The Requirement of Delivery in Gifts of Chattels and of Choses
in Action Evidenced by Commercial Instruments (1926) 21 Ill. L. REv. 341, 354.
," Cases cited supra note 19; see Mechem, Gifts or Corporation Shares (1925)
20 ILL. L. REv. 9, 27.
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its benefits.50 Now it was seen that some of the cases say that until
delivery of the certificate to the donee the donor still has control over the
stock and can compel the company to transfer it back to him, and can
deal with it as he wishes."' However, he has induced the corporation to
accept the donee as a stockholder, with resulting rights and liabilities
on both sides.52 Thenceforth, if the transfer was made with donative
intent, it is wrongful on the part of the donor or the corporation to deal
with the stock without the assent of the transferee; and throughout the
cases upholding such gifts5 3 it is reiterated that the donor by the trans-
fer has put it beyond his power lawfully to sell or assign the stock or
have the company re-issue it to him without the signature and consent
of the donee.54
The fact that the donor reserves the right to the dividends during
his lifetime does not invalidate the gift.55 As one court stated it, the
reservation of dividends "was merely a limitation on the quantity of the
contemplated gift, and in no way affected its validity." 50 Of course, if
there never was an intended gift the owner is able to have the stock
re-issued to him ;57 but it has been held, where valid gifts were made in
this manner and the donor later repudiated the gift, that the donee may
compel the donor or the corporation to restore the stock to him. 8
When we come to gifts creating joint ownership in donor and donee,
transfer on the corporation books seems to fulfill the requirements of
delivery even more adequately than in the case of a gift of the entire
interest, because delivery of the new certificate back to the donor is in
effect delivery to one of two joint tenants, and delivery to one is delivery
"'Webster v. Upton, 91 U. S. 65, 23 L. ed. 384 (1875); Thomas v. Thomas,
.70 Colo. 29, 197 Pac. 243 (1921); 6 THoMPsoN ON COPORATIONS (3rd ed.)
§§4394, 4335; 11 FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATIONS §5092.1 Cases cited supra note 19.52 Francis v. New York & B. E. Ry., 108 N. Y. 93, 15 N. E. 192 (1888).
" See note 19 supra.
" Marshall v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 57 F. (2d) 633 (C. C. A.
6th, 1932); Lynch v. Lynch, 124 Cal. App. 454, 12 P. (2d) 741 (1932); Chicago
Title & Trust Co. v. Ward, 332 Ill. 126, 163 N. E. 319 (1928) ; Benton v. Smith,
- Mo. App. -, 171 S. W. (2d) 767 (1943); Whitney v. Whitney Elevator &
Warehouse Co., 121 Misc. 461, 200 N. Y. Supp. 792 (1923) ; Francis v. New York
& B. E. Ry., 108 N. Y. 93, 15 N. E. 192 (1888); Sinpnton v. Dwyer, 167 Ore.
50, 115 P. (2d) 316 (1941) ; Manning v. U. S. Nat'l Bank of Portland, 174 Ore.
118, 148 P. (2d) 255 (1944); Robert's Appeal, 85 Pa. 84 (1877); Copeland v.
Craig, 193 S. C. 484, 8 S. E. (2d) 858 (1940) ; Ellsworth v. Ellsworth, 151 S. W.
(2d) 628 (Tex. 1941) ; Phillips v. Plastridge, 107 Vt. 267, 179 Atl. 157, 99 A. L. R.
1074 (1935); CHRISTY, THE TRANSERn OF SToCK (1929) §220; 2 CooK oN CoR-
PORATIONS (8th ed.) §308; MACHEN, MODERN LAW OF CORPORATIONS (1908 ed.)
§1006.55Grissom v. Sternberger, 10 F. (2d) 764 (C. C. A. 4th, 1926).
Smith v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 59 F. (2d) 533 (C. C. A. 9th,
193 Hotaling v. Hotaling, 187 Cal. 695, 203 Pac. 745 (1922).
"
8 Jean v. Jean, 207 Cal. 115, 277 Pac. 313 (1929) ; Lynch v. Lynch, 124 Cal.
App. 454, 12 P. (2d) 741 (1932); Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Ward, 332 Ill.
126, 163 N. E. 319 (1928).
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to both, just as possession of one is possession of both.p Moreover,
since in this situation the donor is not giving away his entire interest in
the property, but is retaining an undivided one-half interest with right
of survivorship, it is not at all inconsistent with a valid gift for him to
retain dominion and control to the extent of his interest,60 as long as
he does not exercise sole dominion; and this he cannot do because the
donee's assent is necessary for any disposition he makes of the stock.6 '
If the donee indorse dividend checks to him, he receives the proceeds
by the donee's act and not from the corporation, thus recognizing the
donee's ownership.6 2
Thus it seems that transfer in joint ownership accomplishes what
actual delivery is supposed to do-provide the donee with means of
obtaining dominion over the gift, as far as the nature of the property
and the extent of the gift allow.es Of course, if there is anything pres-
ent to cast doubt on the donative intent, the transaction is ineffective
to pass title, just as would be actual delivery of a chattel without dona-
tive intent.64 But in our problem, lacking any evidence on intent, the
language of the certificate itself should permit an inference sufficient in
the absence of a contrary showing to make a prima facie case of donative
intent.6 5 It should testify that the donor has consciously attempted to
create a present joint estate.66 When this intent is translated into de-
livery by transfer on the books, the donor has performed an act chang-
ing the character of his possession from that of sole owner to that of
a co-tenant.
0 7
Abegg v. Hirst, 144 Iowa 196, 122 N. W. 838 (1909); Benton v. Smith,
Mo..App. - , 171 S. W. (2d) 767 (1943); East Rutherford Savings, Loan
& Bldg. Assn. v. McKenzie, 87 N. J. Eq. 375, 100 Atl. 931 (1917); Mechem,
supra note 13, at 27.
o Cases involving joint gifts cited supra note 19. In East Rutherford Savings,
Loan & Bldg. Assn. v. McKenzie, cited supra note 59, the court said that the donor,
"as joint tenant with right of survivorship, had such an interest in his right of
survivorship as permitted him to hold and manage the joint property for the best
advantage of all concerned.
"l See note 54 supra,
"Lynch v. Lynch, 124 Cal. App. 454, 12 P. (2d) 741 (1932); Copeland v.
Craig, 193 S. C. 484, 8 S. E. (2d) 858 (1940).
" See Mechem, supra note 13, at 27; Mechem, Delivery in Gifts of Chattels
(1926) 21 ILL. L. REv. 341, 354.
'See note 2 supra.
"Edmonds v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 90 F. (2d) 14 (C. C. A.
9th, 1937); Lynch v. Lynch, 124 Cal. App. 454, 12 P. (2d) 741 (1932); Eisen-
hardt v. Lowell, 105 Colo. 417, 98 P. (2d) 1001 (1940) ; East Rutherford Savings,
Loan & Bldg. Assn. v. McKenzie, 87 N. J. Eq. 375, 100 Atl. 931 (1917) ; Cope-
land v. Craig, 193 S. C. 484, 8 S. E. (2d) 858 (1940) ; Simton v. Dwyer, 167 Ore.
50, 115 P. (2d) 316 (1941) ; Manning v. U. S. Nat'l Bank of Portland, 174 Ore.
118, 148 P. (2d) 255 (1944).
" In Eisenhardt v. Lowell, cited supra note 65, the court said, "The unequiv-
ocal declarations of the new certificate are taken as prima fade disclosing the
apparent intention of Mr. Lowell to create a joint estate." In Manning v. U. S.
Nat'l Bank of Portland, cited supra note 65, it -was said, "We find in the written
instruments convincing proof of the existence of such intent."
'7 Napier v. Eigel, 350 Mo. 111, 164 S. W. (2d) 908 (1942).
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. This rationale was not followed in the principal case; rather it was
intimated that even if donative intent were conceded, this transaction
fell short of the requisite delivery.68 It is submitted that the decision
contains an inconsistency. While the majority opinion recognized that
a -joint tenancy in personalty may be created by contract,69 it ruled that
the donee was not entitled to all the stock as survivor, but granted her
the half interest which had been conceded by the parties.70 But in order for
any part of the title to vest in her by gift there must have been donative
intent and delivery.71 By conceding her the half interest the parties
conceded donative intent and delivery; and although the court was only
determining title to that portion of the stock which was in dispute, yet
this concession of the parties created a necessary inference which was a
part of the agreed case. Therefore, if donative intent and delivery were
present it would be an executed gift in joint ownership, and she should
take all by the right of survivorship incorporated in the instrument
creating the gift.7 2
In the final analysis, the parties here stipulated certain facts.
Whether there was constructive delivery with donative intent was the
crucial fact to be determined, the answer being an inference of fact.
The dissent said that the majority opinion conceded that there were
permissible inferences of fact yet undetermined, 7 but ruled against the
donee because not enough facts were stipulated on which to base a defi-
nite decision.74 The dissent contended that the cause should have been
remanded for further proceedings to determine fully the facts, citing
cases in which that was done when the case agreed did not state enough
8 In a memorandum in 226 N. C. app. stated not to be binding on the court,
but rather in explanation of the denial of the petition to rehear, it was said, "A
joint tenancy in stock with a provision for survival of ownership, where the donor
retains custody of the stock, nothing else appearing, in our opinion, does not meet
the definition of a gift inter zivos. The possession of a joint tenant is not that
exclusive, absolute, and unconditional possession contemplated in a gift inter
zivos."8 Citing Taylor v. Smith, 116 N. C. 531, 21 S. E. 202 (1895).
" The court said, "We note that appellants concede that Rossie Mae Barnes
was entitled to one half interest in the 70 shares, upon the view that the statute
(G. S. 41-2) converted the joint tenancy into tenancy in common, and that by
virtue of his right to partition under G. S. 46-42, the testator retained control
over his property to the extent of his interest therein.'
G. S. §41-42, however, does not convert joint tenancies into tenancies in com-
mon; it merely abolishes survivorship as an incident to existing joint tenancies
where it would occur by operation of law, and does not prohibit persons from con-
tracting in such manner as to create survivorship. (See note 39 supra.) And as
the dissent stated, the fact that G. S. §46-42 gives a joint tenant the right to
petition for partition has no bearing on the question of delivery or whether thejoint estate was created. He had that right no matter who held the certificate
and regardless how the estate was created. "The estate created and not the
retention of the certificate gave him the right."7 1Newman v. Bost, 122 N. C. 524, 29 S. E. 848 (1898).2Jones v. Waldroup, 217 N. C. 178, 7 S. E. (2d) 366 (1940).T8Buffaloe v. Barnes, cited supra note 1, at 319.74Id. at 324 (dissenting opinion). "
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facts for a fair conclusion of law to be drawn.75 If the gift is not to
be approved under the theory suggested herein, then it would seem
preferable to take the action urged by the dissenting opinion.76 If no
additional facts could be stipulated, it would be an appropriate case for
a jury to determine whether there was donative intent and delivery.77
LOGAN D. HOWELL.
7 Trustees of Elon College v. Elon Banking & Trust Co., 182 N. C. 298, 109
S. E. 6 (1921); Briggs v. Asheville Developers, 191 N. C. 784, 133 S. E. 3(1926). To the same effect see Hood v. Johnson, 208 N. C. 77, 178 S. E. 855(1935) ; Sedbury v. Southern Express Co., 164 N. C. 363, 79 S. E. 286 (1913).
However, in the court's memorandum denying the petition to rehear, cited supra
note 68, it was said that even if donative intent or other inferences were drawn
from further findings of fact, it could not cure the lack of absolute delivery, of
the stock to the donee which is necessary in a gift inter vivos.
' In Zollicoffer v. Zollicoffer, 168 N. C. 326, 84 S. E. 349 (1915), our court
allowed the question of delivery to go to the jury when the evidence on the whole
tended to show that there had been no delivery. And in Grissom v. Sternberger,
10 F. (2d) 764 (C. C. A. 4th, 1926), it was held error for the trial judge to rule
as a matter of law that there was no gift; it was for the jury to say what in-
ferences were to be drawn.
"The opinion in the principal case did not refer to the applicability of the
Uniform Stock Transfer Act [N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §§55-81 to 55-104], en-
acted in North Carolina in 1941. The general purpose of the Act is to cbnfer
attributes of negotiability upon stock certificates; as a corollary, the importance of
the transfer on the corporation books is diminished. For discussion of the general
problem see Mechem, supra note 13, at 28; Notes (1941) 19 N. C. L. REV. 469,(1939) 37 Micm. L. Rxv. 480, 48 YALE L. J. 897.
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